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Articles
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE "RIGHT TO DIE"
THOMAS WM. MAYO*

"Concepts without perceptions are empty; perceptions
without concepts are blind."'
INTRODUCTION

On July 3, 1989, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its long-awaited decision on abortion in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.2 On the same day, the Court not only accepted three
more abortion cases for review in its 1989 Term,3 but also agreed to
hear for the first time a case involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.4

The Court's speed in accepting three new abortion cases for its
next term was surprising. Webster had subjected the Court to a barrage of publicity, demonstrations, and amicus briefs that probably
was without equal in the Court's history. 5 Moreover, the process of
Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Of Counsel,
Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas. B.A., Amherst College, 1971;J.D., Syracuse University, 1977. I am particularly grateful to Yale Kamisar for his detailed review of the manuscript and the time he has spent sharing his comments. Thanks also are due my
research assistants: Susan Hull,Janice Moss, Dawn Phillips, and Lisa Sriver, all of Southern Methodist University. Finally, I am pleased to acknowledge Southern Methodist
University School of Law's financial support for this project.
1. The quotation has been attributed to Immanuel Kant. See A. MACINTYRE, A
SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 191 (1966). Try as I might, I have not found the original
source of this quotation, although its sense pervades most of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. See Walsh, Immanuel Kant, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 305 (P. Edwards ed.
1967).
2. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
3. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989) (probable
jurisdiction noted); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989) (question ofjurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits), dismissed by consent of parties, 1989 U.S.
LEXIS 5818; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (certiorari granted).
4. 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (certiorari granted).
5. See Kolbert, The Webster Amicus Curiae Briefs: Perspectives on the Abortion Controversy and the Role of the Supreme Court, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 153, 154 nn. 5 & 6 (1989); see also
109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the Court's "sovereignty [over abortion law] which . . .quite properly, but to the great damage of the Court, makes it the
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decision, if the final opinions are any guide, must have been a bruising one.6 Court observers might have been excused their mistaken
belief that the Court would wait for at least a year before reopening
these fresh wounds.
The decision to accept Cruzan, on the other hand, was both
more and less of a surprise. It was more surprising because the
Court had never before accepted a so-called "right to die" 7 case,
object of the sort of organized public pressure that political institutions in a democracy
ought to receive").
6. The case produced five separate opinions. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3046 (Rehnquist, CJ., plurality opinion); id. at 3058 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3064 (Scalia,
J., concurring); id. at 3067 (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court consisted of a statement of facts (Part I)
and analysis (Parts II-A through -C). Id. at 3047, 3049-54. Part II-D of his opinion and
his conclusion (Part III) were joined only by Justices White and Kennedy. Id. at 305458. The ChiefJustice's opinion was joined by three different alignments of the Justices.
In addition, the Justices' divisiveness in Webster occasionally was matched by the hostile
and even scornful tone of their rhetoric. For example, Justice Scalia wrote that part of
Justice O'Connor's opinion "cannot be taken seriously," id. at 3064, and characterized
both the result in Webster and another ofJustice O'Connor's arguments as "irrational,"
id. at 3066 n.*. Justice Blackmun's opinion evidences a similar exasperation with his
colleagues:
Never in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court that
so foments disregard for the law and for our standing decisions.... Nor in my
memory has a plurality gone about its decision in such a deceptive fashion....
I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court.
Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. Commentators are fond of putting the words "right to die" in quotation marks,
as the title of this article does, as if to preface them with the phrase "the so-called." See,
e.g., B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW-CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 835-954 (1987);J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
764-65 (2d ed. 1983); Fletcher, The "Right" to Live and the "Right" to Die, HUMANIST, JulyAug. 1974, at 12; Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 375 (1988);
Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient 's Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 707, 719 (1987); Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
348, 354 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Criminal Liability]; Note, Appointing an Agent to Make
Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 987 (1984); Verhovek, 'Right to Die'
Inquiries Rise After Rulings, N.Y. Times,June 26, 1987, BI, col. 2. Although "right to die"
is an instantly evocative phrase, for some of these writers the preferred statement of the
issue invokes the right to refuse treatment rather than the right to die. E.g., Annas, The
Insane Root Takes Reason Prisoner,HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 29. Is this
anything more than a linguistic dodge? After all, when dealing with life-sustaining treatment, a patient's or guardian's refusal to consent to treatment surely will lead to the
patient's death; that is the whole point. Why should we not confront this inevitable and
sought-after end in our statement and analysis of the issue?
One reason for avoiding the "right to die" formulation of the patient treatment
problem is that it merely pits one set of preferences against another: the patient's choice
of a hastened death versus the state's traditional role of preserving and protecting life.
The claimed right to die unavoidably bumps up against the state's duty to protect and
preserve life. It, however, is a conflict that lacks rules and standards for decision. When
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despite its opportunities to do so, 8 and because some respectable
doubt existed as to whether the federal constitutional right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe v. Wade' ° extended to medical decision-making in such cases." Admittedly, the
Court's mere acceptance of the case does not constitute a declaration that the federal right of privacy extends to medical decisionthis clash of naked preferences occurs in litigation, there is precious little legal content
to guide decision-makers but, rather, a subjective choice by a judge whose own preferences are the likeliest guide to a result.
Moreover, viewing these as "right to refuse treatment" cases brings into view the
doctrine, recognized to some extent in all American jurisdictions, of informed consent.
The right of a patient not only to be given the relevant information needed to make a
choice concerning medical treatment, but also to decide in favor of a given treatment
option or against all treatment options, is fundamental to both ethical and legal thinking
about the rights of patients. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 17-32, 35-129 (1987); R. FADEN & T.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 3-22, 60-150 (1986); J.
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:

A

REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IM-

PLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP

18-31,

41-111 (1982). Thus, the shift from "right to die" to "right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment" introduces, on the patient's side of the argument, a well-recognized
legal right that evokes the patient's actual circumstances, against which the state's powerful and basic, but somewhat abstract, preference for life must be weighed.
8. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d
880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980), rev'd
sub nom. Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup.
Ct. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon (In re Eichner), 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1980), modified sub nom. Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. For example, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the federal right of privacy developed by the United States Supreme Court "is broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. In In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985), however, the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to back away from its earlier
holding despite the striking similarities between the patient's situations in Quinlan and
Conroy: "While this right of privacy might apply in a case such as this, we need not decide
that issue since the right to decline medical treatment is, in any event, embraced within
the common-law right to self-determination." Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223 (emphasis
added). Only a handful of decisions (and only one by a federal court) have rested the
right of an incompetent patient to refuse medical treatment solely upon the federal constitutional right to privacy. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D.R.I. 1988);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424-25 (1977); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9-10, 426 N.E.2d
809, 814-15 (1980).
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making. It does suggest, however, that there are not six justices
who firmly believe that there is no such federal right. 2 Moreover, a
decision to bring the "right to die" cases within the ambit of federal
privacy law could thrust the Court into the role of "super medical
practice board" for the nation, a role that some justices have abjured in the Court's abortion cases.' 3 Finally, Cruzan involves a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS)"4 who is receiving
artificial nutrition and hydration 5 and who did not execute an advance directive (such as a living will), arguably the most difficult of
the "right to die" cases from both a medical and a legal point of
view. 16
Nevertheless, there was a certain predictability about the
12. A third possibility should be mentioned, namely, that at least four justices agreed
to accept the case to state definitively that no federal constitutional rights are implicated
by the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan.
13. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, J.); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976) (Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
14. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). The term "persistent vegetative state" (PVS) is one that has
caused considerable confusion in both the legal and medical communities. See Cranford,
The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 27; Wolf, The Persistent Problem of PVS, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 26. Unlike "brain death," which denotes the cessation of all
brain activity (in both the cerebral hemispheres and the brain stem), PVS is characterized by a relatively intact brain stem system. Thus, the usual brain stem functions-eye
movements, pupillary response to light, spontaneous respiration, and the cough, gag,
and swallowing reflexes-are present. In part because the protective reflexes are usually
normal, which helps to prevent the frequent respiratory infections experienced by comatose patients, the PVS patient without other terminal illness or injury often can survive
for long periods of time. Cranford, supra, at 27-28.
15. Because PVS patients may retain their gag, cough, and swallowing reflexes,
Cranford, supra note 14, at 31, "it is theoretically, and in rare cases practically possible,
to feed these patients by hand.... However, the overwhelming majority of patients are
given fluids and nutrition by nasograstic tubing, gastrostomy, or other medical means."
Id.
16. Professor Yale Kamisar, in his Philip A. Hart Lecture at Georgetown University
Law Center, considered the argument that passive euthanasia as it has come to be practiced in the United States risks moving us toward a greater willingness to accept active
euthanasia. Kamisar, who believes the "slippery slope" argument has some validity in
this instance, offered three plausible and useful points at which we could have drawn the
line and forbidden the practice of passive euthanasia:
We might, for example, have (1) stopped short of discontinuing nourishment and hydration; (2) restricted the so-called right to die to competent patients
who express a desire to die or to those who executed a living will or its
equivalent before becoming incompetent; or (3) limited the right to dying patients. We have done none of these things.
Y. Kamisar, Some Call It "Death With Dignity, " Others Call It the "Right to Die. " What Is It
Really?, Philip A. Hart Lecture, Georgetown Univ. Law Center 4 (Apr. 14, 1988) (empha-
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Court's decision to accept Cruzan-at least in hindsight. As with
other issues repeatedly presented to the Court for decision, the
question of a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
probably needed to "percolate" for a period of time in the lower
courts before the Supreme Court could feel comfortable dealing
with it. With nearly fifteen years' worth of cases since the New
Jersey courts decided In re Quinlan, 7 the Court now may feel that
the issue has developed sufficiently for a closer look.'"
sis in original) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review). All three of Professor Kamisar's
proffered stopping-off points, of course, are critical factors present in the Cruzan case.
17. 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc);
Drabick v. Drabick (In re Drabick), 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984);
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Dority v.
Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983); Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); Severns v. Wilmington
Medical Center (In re Severns), 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980);John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500
So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), approved, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla.
1986); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d
232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re Gardner, 534
A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d
626 (1986); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); In re Spring,
380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464
N.E.2d 959, review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Dinnerstein, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter,
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; In re
Requena, 213 NJ. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517
A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986); In re Clark, 210 N.J. Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (Ch. Div.
1986), aff'd, 216 N.J. Super. 497, 524 A.2d 448 (App. Div. 1987); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J.
Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (Ch. Div. 1986); Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Beth Israel
Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Workmen's Circle
Home & Infirmary for the Aged v. Fink, 135 Misc. 2d 270, 514 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1987); In re O'Brien, 135 Misc. 2d 1076, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Center (In re Delio), 134 Misc. 2d 206, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415
(Sup. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); Vogel v. Forman, 134
Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Saunders v. State (In re Saunders), 129
Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101,485 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985); A. B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672,
477 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1984); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp. v. Cinque, 116 Misc. 2d 477,
455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982); In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 2d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255, cert.
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Moreover, Cruzan was the first of these cases to come to the
Court in which the court of decision had not respected a surrogate
decision-maker's request to forego life-sustaining treatment.' 9 Earlier cases presented to the Court had found such a right and based
their holding on either state law or a combination of state and federal law. Thus, the existence of an' independent state ground for
these lower court decisions made them unlikely candidates for
Supreme Court review."z The Cruzan case, by contrast, presented
the federal question in perfect relief. As the following recitation of
the facts in Cruzan illustrates, however, the Court has accepted a
proverbial "hard case" for its first attempt to grapple with the no-

tion of a federal right to die.
Following a car accident, Nancy Beth Cruzan was found by a
state highway patrol trooper approximately thirty-five feet from her
vehicle.2 She was not breathing and had no perceptible pulse.22
Although her heart beat and respiration were revived, she did not
regain consciousness.23 Ms. Cruzan had experienced significant
deprivation of oxygen to her brain for a period of twelve to fourteen
minutes, resulting in irreversible atrophy of her cerebral hemi-

spheres. 24 While she has normal respiratory and circulatory function, she lacks both her voluntary and involuntary swallowing
ability, and shows no response to all but the most painful stimuli.2 5
Although her medical condition probably has shortened her life expectancy somewhat,2 6 medical testimony to the trial court indicated
that she could live in this condition for another thirty years. 2 7
denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Estate of Dorone, 349 Pa. Super. 59, 502 A.2d 1271 (1985),
aff'd, 517 Pa. 3, 534 A.2d 452 (1987); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545,
747 P.2d 445 (1987) (en banc); In re Guardianship of Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689
P.2d 1363 (1984) (en banc); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d
1372 (1984) (en banc); Dinino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297
(1984) (en banc); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (en
banc).
19. Compare Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) with cases
cited supra note 8.
20. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-28 (1945) (judgments of state courts
resting on adequate and independent state grounds will not be reviewed); Fox Film
Corp. v. Miller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (same); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers'
Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1917) (same).
21. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410-11.
22. Id. at 411.
23. Id. at 410-11.
24. Id.
25. Id.

26. See Cranford, supra note 14, at 30-3 1.
27. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411. Such testimony must be read in light of the substan-
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After three weeks in a transient coma, 28 Ms. Cruzan recovered

somewhat and was able to take food and water orally.2 9 Thereafter,
a gastrostomy tube was inserted through her abdominal wall "to assist her recovery and ease the feeding process." 30 She then evolved
into a fully developed persistent vegetative state and now gets all of
her nutrition and hydration through the gastrostomy tube.'
Ms. Cruzan's case became a legal one when her parents, as coguardians, requested that their daughter's artificial hydration and
nutrition be terminated.3 2 Employees of the Mount Vernon State
33
Hospital, where Ms. Cruzan was being cared for, refused to do so.
Her parents then sought, and received, a declaratory judgment that
Missouri law could not prevent the removal of her gastrostomy tube
without violating her "right to liberty, due process of law and equal
protection under the state and federal constitutions. ' 34 The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed.3 5
The court held that neither the state nor the federal constitution gave Nancy Beth Cruzan the right to have her gastrostomy tube
removed. 3 6 Relying upon Missouri's interest "in the prolongation
tial uncertainty that naturally surrounds such a medical judgment. Nancy Beth Cruzan is
young enough that she probably will not be as prone to as many of the "medical complications secondary to prolonged immobility and unresponsiveness" as are elderly PVS
patients. See Cranford, supra note 14, at 31. On the other hand, her long-term prospects
for survival in a persistent vegetative state also depend upon the relative effectiveness of
her cough and gag reflexes, as well as the strength of her natural resistance to infection.
Id. As of Ma ch 1988, "[t]he longest reported, well documented, survival (without recovery) was thirty-seven years, 111 days." Id.
28. PVS patients who, like Nancy Beth Cruzan, have experienced a significant deprivation of oxygen to the brain for several minutes, are typically in a coma (eyes closed,
unconsciousness and impaired or absent involuntary reflexes) before entering a PVS. See
Cranford, supra note 14, at 28; see also Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life
Support, 263 J. A.M.A. 426, 427 (1990) [hereinafter Council Report].
29. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 410.
33. Id. As explained by Solicitor General Starr during oral argument before the
Supreme Court, Mount Vernon is a rehabilitation facility that is dedicated to the longterm care of patients in chronic conditions and has never before agreed to the removal
of nutrition and hydration. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-47, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health (U.S. No. 88-1503) (Dec. 6, 1989).
34. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 417-18. The court's ruling on the Missouri constitution has an elusive,
almost surreal quality to it. In the court's view, the issue was whether Nancy Beth Cruzan
enjoyed an "unfettered right of privacy under our constitution that would support the
right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance." Id. at 417. The
court's conclusion, not too surprisingly in light of their unbounded formulation of the
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of the life of the individual patient and . . . in the sanctity of life
itself,"3 7 interests that the court deemed unqualified by considera38
tions of the quality of life of a particular patient, the court conoutweighed Nancy Beth Cruzan's
cluded that the state's interests
39
treatment.
interest in refusing
Thus, Cruzan ultimately turns on a fairly straightforward constitutional issue: Whether the federal constitutional right of privacy
extends to decisions, made on behalf of permanently unconscious
patients,40 to have life-sustaining medical treatment discontinued
and, if so, whether a state's interest in the sanctity of life can override the patient's privacy right?4 ' This article argues that on doctrinal as well as policy grounds, no such right should be recognized as
question presented, was that she did not. Id. at 418. The court's treatment of the federal constitutional issue starts with the same broad question-"If Nancy possesses such a
right, it must be found to derive from the federal constitutional right to privacy." Id.
(emphasis added). The court stated that it "carr[ied] grave doubts as to the applicability
of privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of food and water to an incompetent patient." Id. It went on to conclude-somewhat less broadly, however-that "a
decision by Nancy's co-guardians to withdraw food and water under these circumstances cannot be sustained." Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 419.
38. Id. at 420; see also id. at 422 ("[T]he state's interest is not in quality of life. The
state's interest is an unqualified interest in life.").
39. Id. at 424. The Missouri Supreme Court never conclusively determined that the
federal constitutional right of privacy applied to this situation. Rather, the court in effect concluded that the state's interest in life outweighed whatever federal right Nancy
Beth Cruzan might have in having her medical treatment discontinued.
40. Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, "incompetent
patient" refers to patients who have lost consciousness without any reasonable hope of
recovery. Different, and in some ways more difficult, issues are raised by the problem of
medical decision-making for incompetent patients who are conscious and aware. An
example of such a patient is Mary O'Connor in In re Westchester County Medical
Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). It seems remarkable,
and somewhat chilling, that neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the press coverage of the case acknowledged that for the first time, the New York Court had implicitly
accepted the application of the "substituted judgment" standard to an incompetent patient who was still conscious. See, e.g., Shipp, Many Courts Have Upheld Right to Die, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1988, at A36, col. 6; Shipp, New York's Highest Court Rejects Family's Plea in
Right-to-Die Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1988, at Al, col. 1. Despite the ease with which
the court appeared to apply to Mary O'Connor legal standards that previously had been
applied only to patients who were incompetent and unconscious, the extension of the
prior case law to an incompetent, conscious patient seriously challenges the traditional
distinction between "killing" and "letting die." It also highlights the "quality of life"
determination that is lurking behind most, if not all, decisions to withhold treatment
(including nutrition and hydration), even when hospitals, physicians, and courts purport
to be following the patient's earlier-expressed wishes.
41. The lower court in Cruzan held "that to deny Nancy's co-guardians authority to
act under these circumstances would deprive Nancy of equal protection of the law." 760
S.W.2d at 411. The Missouri Supreme Court, with the acquiescence of the parties,
viewed "th[el issue [as] a broad one, invoking . . . the amorphous mass of constitutional
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a matter of federal constitutional law. Part I of the article reviews
the Supreme Court's privacy decisions, with a special emphasis on
the abortion decisions, and concludes that current privacy doctrine
does not extend to medical decision-making on behalf of PVS patients. Part II considers whether there are reasons for recognizing a
"fundamental right" that is protected by the federal constitution to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for PVS patients. Part II
concludes that, as important as it is to develop a response to the
problem of incompetent patients that is ethically, legally, and medically acceptable, strong arguments nonetheless militate against such
a move by the Supreme Court and in favor of continued state sovereignty over this issue at this time.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PRIVACY CASES

A.

Early Development

In Whalen v. Roe,4 2 Justice Stevens wrote for the Court: "The
cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decirights generally described as the 'right to liberty', the 'right to privacy', equal protection
and due process." Id. at 412.
For purposes of this article, it is enough to note that, in modern cases, the Supreme
Court has regarded the "privacy" right as fundamental to the notion of liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"); see also, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of
privacy [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action."); id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Clearly, therefore,
the Court today is correct in holding that the right asserted by Jane Roe is embraced
within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wol A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ.
920, 920 (1973) ("The broad outlines of [the Supreme Court's] argument [in Roe v.
Wade] are not difficult to make out: ... The right to privacy ... is protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). It is of no particular moment whether
state action that infringes upon this fundamental right is to be judged under the rubric
of "substantive due process" or "equal protection." See, e.g., Schneider, State Interest
Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "'Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalizationof Social
Issues, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81 & n.7 (1988); cf. Ely, supra, at 928 n.58 ("[The
Court's] inability to pigeonhole confidently the right involved [privacy] is not important
in and of itself."). The Supreme Court in Roe either "borrowed" or "applied" the equal
protection clause's heightened judicial scrutiny and required that the state's interference
with the privacy right must be justified by reference to a "compelling state interest." See
410 U.S. at 155-56.
42. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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sions.
Over the course of more than a dozen privacy decisions,
the Supreme Court repeatedly has expressed itself in similar terms
that could encompass a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medi44
cal treatment.
The second interest implicated by the right of privacy reflects
the Supreme Court's historical willingness to protect the concept of
autonomy. In each new privacy case the Court has delineated a little
more fully those areas of human conduct in which the Court is willing to make the individual secure from unwarranted intrusion by the
state.
This formulation of the privacy issue illuminates the two levels
on which a struggle for dominance is played out. The first-order
conflict is between the individual who wishes to pursue his or her
self-deterministic course, and the state, which-under the expansive
rubric of the police power-seeks either to regulate that course of
action or to curtail it altogether.4 5 When the claimed right is the
43. Id. at 598-600 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The quoted language in
the text echoes the Court's words in Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted):
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however .... the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution .... These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that
can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
44. E.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,655 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70
n. II(1976); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897);
see also, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (implying recognition of a patient's right to
refuse treatment).
45. Most courts have, to one degree or another, treated the right to die issue as one
involving a balance of individual rights and state interests. In In re Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court saw the dispute as one between the patient's right to die, on the
one hand, and the state's interest in preserving life and the physician's right to administer medical treatment according to his or her best judgment, on the other. 70 N.J. 10,
40-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Later cases adopted this
general approach. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1986); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 426-27, 529 A.2d 434,
451 (1987); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047,
1051-52 (1984).
The balancing approach received its most influential restatement by the Massachu-
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right to refuse medical treatment, the courts in the seventeen states
that have considered the question 46 have been, on the whole, quite
yielding. They generally recognize at least a qualified right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment that may be exercised by competent patients 4 7 and by guardians or others on behalf of incompetent
patients.4" By contrast, Cruzan represents one of the few cases in
which the state refused to yield to the autonomy claimed on behalf
49
of an incompetent patient.
The second-order conflict is between the states, who would
draw the boundaries and define the content of any right to refuse to
consent to medical treatment, and the federal government, represented by the, Supreme Court, which holds the ultimate trump card
of the federal constitution. Thus, one of the questions raised by
Cruzan, as with all privacy cases, is whether the autonomous right of
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). In that case, the patient was a 67year-old state institutionalized resident with an I.Q. of 10 suffering from leukemia, for
whom the treatment issue involved chemotherapy. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. The
court identified four countervailing state interests to be weighed against the wishes expressed on behalf of the incompetent patient: the state's "interest in: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. These interests have been recited with talismanic
regularity in the majority of right to die cases decided since Saikewicz.
46. See supra note 18.
47. Sge, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 300 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220, 225 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 384, 376
N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 NJ. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785,
789 (Prob. Div. 1978); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706
(1962); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (1973). Professor George Annas' comments reflect the clear trend: "It is almost incredible that anyone could ever think that it
was acceptable to force unwanted treatment on a patient. Competent adults may refuse
any treatment, including life-saving and life-sustaining treatment, and artificial nutrition
and hydration." G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 199-200 (1989) (emphasis in
original).
48. E.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 431, 441, 497 N.E.2d
626, 633, 639-40 (1986); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984); In re Eichner,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 372, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (1981) (but only when
clear and convincing evidence existed as to the patient's desires regarding the use of
such procedures); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 127-28, 660 P.2d 738, 746 (1983).
49. See also, e.g., Vogel v. Forman, 134 Misc. 2d 395, 398-99, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624
(Sup. Ct. 1986) (denying the application for authorization to remove a tube supplying
nutrition and hydration to stroke victim in vegetative state when the patient is not brain
dead or terminally ill); cf. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 53435, 531 N.E.2d 607, 615-16, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 894-95 (1988) (disallowing an incompetent patient's daughters to "substitute judgment" and withhold life support because no
one knew what the patient would do if she were competent to make the decision).
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self-determination claimed by (or on behalf of) the individual involves an area of activity or a set of relationships that the Supreme
Court regards as so important that a state cannot burden that right
except to the extent necessary to promote a compelling state
50

interest.

Has the Supreme Court viewed the right of patients to refuse
medical treatment as fundamentally important to ingrained notions
of individual freedom and autonomy? Although many lower courts
have posited a constitutional basis for informed consent, the Court
has discussed "informed consent" in fewer than twenty cases. With
the exception of the occasional reference to the concept in cases
outside the health care setting, 5' the Court has discussed informed
consent most extensively in its abortion opinions.5 2
In the abortion cases, the Court has written at some length
about both the doctrine of informed consent and the physician-patient relationship. To understand the Court's position on these two
subjects and their relationship to privacy doctrine, some more general observations about the Court's treatment of privacy are
required.
The Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut5 is the
starting point for any discussion of privacy. Griswold is the first case
in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy, not as a
core value protected by a particular provision of the Bill of Rightssuch as the first, fourth, and fifth amendments-but as an independent constitutional right. 54 Although it is not clear whether the right
to privacy exists at the confluence of several other rights explicitly
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, or is to be found within their penumbra,5 5 the Court concluded in Griswold that Connecticut's prohibition against the use of contraceptives impermissibly infringed
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,

377 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
51. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776. 797-98 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(attorney-client relationship); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 354 (1980) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting) (same).
52. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462

U.S. 416, 439 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647, 650 (1979) (plurality opinion);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 382-85 (1979); Guste v.Jackson, 429 U.S. 399, 400
(1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65 (1976).
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. Id. at 485.
55. The rhetorical difficulties that result from the Court's use of metaphors, and especially its reliance on "penumbra," are analyzed in Greely, A Footnote to "Penumbra" in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1989).
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married persons' right of privacy.5 6
The Court invalidated Connecticut's statute because it
threatened two values the Court sought to protect: the right not to
be unreasonably or unnecessarily required to divulge intimate details about oneself, and the right to engage in the personal, intimate
relationship of marriage free of government intrusion through regulation.5 7 If the latter of these interests had been given primacy in
the Court's opinion, Griswold could be seen as the modern basis for a
right to be free from excessive state regulation of a panoply of private, intimate decisions-including medical decisions-since some
forms of contraception may involve drugs or devices ordered by a
physician. It is difficult to read Griswold this broadly, however, given
the Griswold majority's more serious concern with the pervasive state
surveillance and investigation required to enforce Connecticut's
statute.58
More recent developments have de-emphasized Griswold's concern with excessive surveillance and investigation, but make it
equally clear that Griswold did not establish a broad right of privacy
extending to a large class of personal, intimate decisions. For example, in its post-Griswold opinions, the Court has been unwilling to
check the government's power to investigate with a broad, independent right of privacy. Thus, the Court rejected privacy challenges to governmental investigations in cases involving the
government's access to cancelled checks 59 and individual tax
.records.6 °
The Court's opinion in Stanley v. Georgia6 1 appeared to go
against this grain. In Stanley, the Court held that the state of Georgia could not criminalize the private possession of obscene materials
56. 381 U.S. at 485.
57. Id. at 484-85.
58. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas relied heavily upon the Court's earlier
third, fourth, and fifth amendment cases to make the case for a constitutional "right of
privacy." See id. Douglas' arguments seem to build up to the rhetorical question,
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" Id. at 485.
59. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
60. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978), the Court further demonstrated its intention to limit governmental
powers of surveillance and investigation by reference to the fourth and fifth amendments rather than to other possible sources of privacy rights. In Zurcher, the Court
scarcely mentioned the applicability of the first amendment to a student newspaper's
challenge to an ex parte search warrant of the paper's offices. Id. at 563-66; see also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (compelled grand jury testimony of newsmen held not to violate first amendment).
61. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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for solely private use, relying on the "right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy. '"62 The significance of this opinion, however, as precedent for an independent privacy-based right to be free from governmental investigations proved to be short-lived. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,6 3 the Court abandoned its efforts to limit Stanley to its
facts' and reinterpreted the case as being "firmly grounded in the
First Amendment."

'6 5

The Court's opinion in Bowers illustrates both post-Griswold
trends: the Court's continued movement away from Griswold's privacy-based concern with governmental surveillance and investigation, as well as its reluctance to read Griswold's protection for
private, intimate decisions broadly. In Bowers, the Court rejected a
privacy challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute and spurned the argument that the Court's privacy cases "stand for the proposition
that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription.- 6 6 As it had in
Carey v. Populations Services International,67 the majority characterized
the Court's contraception 68 and abortion6 9 decisions as involving
the fourteenth amendment's protection of the "fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child." 7
Implicitly, and with hindsight, the dominant theme of Griswold has
become that Connecticut lacked a sufficient governmental interest
to justify its attempt to burden the intimate, personal decision
whether to become a parent. This reading is supported by the Bowers majority's rejection 71 of the dissent's arguments that Georgia's
enforcement of its statute by criminal prosecution impermissibly intruded into a private place (the bedroom of one's own home) that
was especially protected by the privacy doctrine.7 2
In sum, Griswold's apparent holding that the surveillance and
62.
63.
64.
United
65.
66.
67.
68.
(1965).
69.
70.

Id. at 564-65.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1971);
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1971).
478 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 191.
431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
71. Id.at 196.
72. Id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id. at
214-20 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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investigatory powers of the state are subject to limitations that may
be inferred from the general right of privacy has extremely limited
remaining significance today. 7 3 Moreover, the second privacy
theme upon which Griswold arguably was based-that individuals enjoy constitutional protection for personal, intimate decisions-must
be read narrowly as well. Far from giving broad protection to such
decisions, Griswold added conception to the short (but growing) list
of activities and interests that are protected from unwarranted governmental regulation by the privacy doctrine. The list apparently
now includes child rearing and education, family7 4relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion.
Missing from this list of privacy-protected activities and interests is medical decision-making in general and, more specifically, the
right to consent or refuse to consent to life sustaining medical treatment. In Mills v. Rogers,75 the Court assumed that the right to refuse
medical treatment was a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest, but it did not have to decide that issue, as the parties in Mills
had agreed that the Constitution protected the right to refuse medi76
cal treatment.
77
Similarly, in Bowen v. American Hospital Association, the Court
assumed the existence of "constitutional doctrines on regulation,
direct or indirect, of speech in general and of decision-making by health
professionals in particular."7 8 Bowen involved a challenge to the socalled "Baby Doe" regulations of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).7 9 The regulations required, among other
things, that state child protective services agencies "prevent in8
The
stances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants."
Court held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"1 did
82
The Court made its
not authorize the rules promulgated by HHS.
73. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("Whatever the ratio decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general interest in
freedom from disclosure of private information.").
74. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (describing the reach of the
Court's privacy cases).
75. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
76. Id. at 299. Because an intervening decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court strengthened patients' rights under federal and state law, id. at 303, the Court
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the change in state law. Id. at 306.
Consequently, the Court did not decide the case on the merits.
77. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
78. Id. at 636 n.22 (emphasis added).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
80. Id.
81. 2 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
82. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 647.
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comment about the constitutional doctrines dealing with "decisionmaking by health professionals" in connection with an argument advanced by Justice White in dissent and, thus, was dicta at best, since
83
the Court's holding was not based on constitutional grounds at all.
The Court came closer to extending the privacy doctrine to individuals' medical decision-making in Whalen v. Roe. 4 In Whalen,
the plaintiffs were patients who regularly received prescriptions for
drugs classified by a New York statute as "Schedule II" drugs, a
class that included opium and opium derivatives, ritalin, percodan,
cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone s5 Plaintiffs
challenged portions of the state's Controlled Substances Act of
197286 that provided for the maintenance of a centralized, comput-

erized file containing the names and addresses of all persons who
7
obtained Schedule II drugs pursuant to a physician's prescription.8
The district court held that "the doctor-patient relationship is one
'
of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection" 88
and
that the New York statute invaded that zone with "a needlessly
broad sweep." 8 9 In light of the testimony of patients, the parents of
minor patients, and physicians,9 o the court found that the central83. Id. at 636 n.22.
84. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
85. Id. at 592-93 & n.8.
86. Act ofJune 8, 1972, ch. 878, 1972 N.Y. Laws 2608 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB.
3 30 0 3 3 9 7
HEALTH LAW §§
g (McKinney 1989)).
87. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
88. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 589
(1977). The court "read Roe v. Wade as holding implicitly and Doe v. Bolton as holding
explicitly that the doctor-patient relationship" was so protected. Id. (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 937.
90. Id. at 934-35. The court found compelling testimony concerning the negative
impact of the centralized prescription register on the patients' medical decision-making
and on the physician-patient relationship. For example, a parent testified that she
stopped giving her child ritalin, a Schedule II drug, because she was afraid that the state
record would stigmatize her son. Id. at 934. The parent testified that although "the
child is not doing well without the medication ....
the alternative . . . is to have him
branded for life." Id. Another woman testified that "[w]hen she learned that under the
new regulation her name was to go on a computer because the amphetamine with which
her condition was treated was a Schedule II drug, she believed she would be labeled a
drug addict." Id. When another woman learned of the law, she stopped taking her medication. Her migraines returned, and she was forced to resume treatment. Id. at 934-35.
She, however, had no confidence that the information would remain confidential. Id.
Several physicians also testified to the law's negative impact. Id. at 935. One was
concerned with the adverse affect on the patient and another with interference with the
physician-patient relationship. Id.
All testified that they felt obligated to advise their patients or a responsible
member of their family about the state prescription program for Schedule II
drugs, and reported a reaction of shock, fear and concern on the part of their
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ized registry created a "fear that the adults or children will be stigmatized if their use of the drug becomes known .

..

[and] intrudes

upon and interferes with the doctor-patient relationship."'"
The Supreme Court reversed, 9 2 and not because it necessarily
disagreed with the district court's inclusion of medical decisionmaking and the physician-patient relationship within a zone of constitutionally protected privacy interests. Rather, the Court held that
"neither the immediate nor the threatened impact of the [registry
scheme] on either the reputation nor the independence of patients
for whom Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to
constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 3 Although Justice Brennan would have held
that the right of privacy extends to medical decision-making such as
was involved in Whalen,9 4 that clearly was not the Court's holding.
Having concluded that the centralized registry did not have a significant effect on patients or their physicians, the Court did not need to
evaluate the state's claim that its interest in such a system was compelling. Indeed, it did not even have to decide that a constitutionally protected privacy interest was implicated by the patients' claims
at all. The most that can be said of Whalen on this issue is that the
question of the constitutional status of the patients' claims was left
open.9 5
B.

The Abortion Cases

The remaining basis for a claim that the Court has extended
privacy protection to medical decision-making and the physician-patient relationship is Roe v. Wade9 6 and its progeny. The claim, however, does not survive close scrutiny of the Court's abortion
decisions.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a personal right
of privacy that is protected by the due process clause and that inpatients on learning that their names would be sent to Albany and put on a
computer.

Id.
91. Id. at 937.
92. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Broad dissemination by state officials of
such information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy
rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests.").
95. See id. at 607-09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (refuting the opinion by Justice Brennan because the cases referred to therein do not support a general constitutional right
to privacy).

96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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cludes a qualified right of "a woman [to decide] whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 9 7 The Court almost simultaneously recited the psychological and physical factors that "the woman and
her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation,"9 " but it is clear that the physician-patient relationship derived
its constitutional protection in Roe because of its integral role in the
woman's abortion decision, not the other way around. In other
words, the protection extended to the physician-patient relationship
and to the woman's right to make a medical decision about her
pregnancy was the necessary, secondary consequence of the Court's
decision to extend the right of privacy to abortion decisions. 99
Some confusion on this point is due to Justice Blackmun's summary of the Court's holding in Roe in terms that emphasized the role
of the physician and the medical nature of the woman's decision.' 0 0
For example, his opinion for the majority states "that, for the period
prior to [the end of the first trimester], the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."''
The Court's discussion of the
physician-patient aspect of abortion should not be misconstrued; it
does not signal the recognition of a constitutional right to practice
medicine,' 0 2 to participate in a physician-patient relationship, or to
make personal medical decisions.'
This seems true for at least three reasons. First, the criminal
statute struck down in Roe v. Wade "restrict[ed] legal abortions to
those 'procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother.'"104 Because the restriction was in
reference to the medical judgment and discretion of the physician, it
97. Id. at 153.
98. Id.
99. But see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("the
right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relationship").
100. 410 U.S. at 163-64 ("For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician.").
101. Id. at 163.
102. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (plurality opinion) (refusing
to decide whether physicians have a constitutionally protected right to practice
medicine). Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, might be read otherwise. See infra
notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
103. But see Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[W]e read Roe
v. Wade as holding implicitly ... that the doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones
of privacy accorded constitutional protection."), rev'd, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
104. 410 U.S. at 164 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1196 (1972)).
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is natural that the Court's formulations of its holding would be expressed in similar terms.
Second, a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy can be infringed either by a restriction that operates directly upon her (such as making a woman who obtains an abortion
guilty of a crime or requiring spousal consent) or by one that operates primarily upon something or someone else and has the secondary effect of limiting her access to the abortion she seeks.
Examples of the latter type of restriction, include licensing requirements for abortion clinics' 0 5 and restrictions upon the scope of
06
A statement
medical practice by physicians licensed by the state.'
of the holding in Roe v. Wade in terms of a secondary restriction
need not alter the scope or nature of the primary right being given
constitutional protection.
Finally, as Professor Tribe has suggested, the Court simply may
have believed that its extraordinary decision in Roe v. Wade would be
more readily accepted if the Court "couched the abortion holding in
medical rather than ethical terms."' 0 7 If this speculation is true, the
nonsubstantive nature of the Court's language regarding the medical aspects of abortion would be manifest. Even if, as Professor Susan Frelich plausibly has maintained, the Court has persisted in "the
view that the doctor's discretion is an intrinsic part of the patient's
'privacy' and something more than an inevitable incident of the
medical nature of the abortion procedure,"' ' there is no logical basis for recognizing a privacy-based constitutional protection for the
physician-patient relationship of medical decision-making other
than in connection with abortion.
Doe v. Bolton,' the companion case to Roe v. Wade, challenges
this reading of Roe but does not overcome it. In Roe, the only physician-party to the action (Dr. Hallford) was ordered dismissed from
the case on Younger-abstention grounds." 0 Thus, absent from the
105. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988),juris. postponed, 109 S. Ct. 3239, dismissed by
consent of parties, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 5818.
106. This was the type of restriction involved in Roe v. Wade itself.
107. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 n.168 (1973).
108. Frelich, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's
Role in 'Private' Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q 183, 202-03 (1985).
109. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
110. 410 U.S. 113, 126-27 (1973). The Court ruled that the lower court should not
have granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford, who was a defendant in a pending criminal prosecution for violating Texas' abortion statute. Id. (relying on Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (disallowing a federal court authority to grant declaratory
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case was the one party in a position to argue that the physician-patient relationship enjoys constitutional protection because of a privacy right unrelated to the woman's personal right to choose an
abortion. In Doe, on the other hand, nine physicians licensed in
Georgia joined a Georgia woman's challenge to the state's criminal
abortion statute."' The Court held justiciable' 12 their claims that
the Georgia law " 'chilled and deterred' them from practicing their
. . . profession[] and deprived them of rights guaranteed by the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments." 1 1 3 The Court went on
to address numerous challenges to the Georgia statute, which required it to consider (among other things)" 4 the factors that a physician must be allowed to consider in deciding whether an abortion
is "necessary," ' 5 as well as the Georgia statute's requirement that
such determinations be confirmed by the independent examinations
of the patient by two other licensed physicians. 16
Because of the Georgia statute's terms and the nature of the
claims raised against it, the Court's opinion in Doe v. Bolton contains
numerous references to professional, medical judgment."17 In this
case, however, medical judgment never quite receives independent
constitutional protection apart from the pregnancy- and abortionrelated rights of the physician's patient. As the Court states in a
particularly telling passage:
relief as to state statute when prosecution under such statute is pending in the state
court at time federal suit is initiated)).
111. 410 U.S. at 184-85.
112. Id. at 188.
113. Id. at 186. The Court declined to reverse the lower court's ruling that other
plaintiffs-seven nurses, five clergy, two social workers, and two non-profit corporations-did not present justiciable claims. Id. at 189. The Court's ruling with respect to
the non-physicians was not based on any skepticism toward their claims, but rather on
the prudential ground that "the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by Doe
and the physician-appellants, and nothing is gained or lost by the[ir] presence or absence." Id.
114. In addition to the issues discussed in the text, the Court also ruled that Georgia's
residence requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, because it infringes upon the rights of patients "who enter Georgia seeking the
medical services that are available there." Doe, 410 U.S. at 200.
The Court also addressed two procedural requirements imposed upon abortion by
the Georgia statute in addition to the procedural requirement mentioned in the text:
"(1) that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals: (2) that the [abortion] be approved by the hospital staff
abortion committee .... ." Id. at 192-98 (footnote omitted). The Court struck down
both requirements on the ground that they unduly restricted the pregnant woman's
rights earlier recognized in Roe. Id. at 194, 198.
115. Id. at 191-92.
116. Id. at 198-200.
117. See id.at 191, 192, 196-97, 199-200.
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We agree.., that the medical judgment may be exercised
in light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being
of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This
allows the attending physician the room he needs to make
his best medical judgment. And it is room that operatesfor the
benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman. 1 18
The constitutional right vindicated in Doe, therefore, is the right to
choose an abortion on the basis of medical advice that is not unduly
fettered by unnecessary (and thus unjustified) state restrictions; it is
not a more general right to give or be given medical advice, or to
direct one's own medical care.
After Roe and Doe, as most Americans who have lived through
the last seventeen years know all too well, the Court has considered
a number of state restrictions upon abortion. Many of these cases
dealt with informed consent and reviewed laws requiring informed
consent, 99 specifying the information required to be given to the
120
patient by the physician before an abortion could be performed,
2
imposing a waiting period after a woman's informed consent,' 1 and
allowing parents or spouses to veto a woman's decision to have an
abortion.12 2 Other cases dealt with the clinical, medical details of
abortion practice. These cases reviewed laws requiring hospital118. Id. at 192 (emphasis added). Roe and Doe undoubtedly paint a somewhat warped
picture of the physician-patient relationship and the process of medical decision-making.
As Professor Susan Frelich has pointed out, these cases and a number of the abortion
decisions that followed them evidence a "preoccupation with deference to doctors and
the standards of their practice" that flows from Roe v. Wade's tendency to "cast[ I the
doctor as the decisionmaker with a status equal to or greater than the individual most
intimately involved." Frelich, supra note 108, at 226, 235 (citing Simopoulos v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983)); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-83
(1983); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983).
This is undoubtedly true, and for the reasons stated in Professor Frelich's perceptive
article. This is yet another reason why the cases should be read as "abortion cases" and
not "informed consent" or "medical decision-making cases."
119. See, e.g., Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 439-42 (holding unconstitutional blanket requirements for parental consent for abortions on minors under age
15); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-75 (1976) (holding unconstitutional spousal and parental consent requirements for abortions for minors, but upholding requirement that a woman give informed consent).
120. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 764-65 (1986) (holding unconstitutional requirements for informed consent
that woman be informed by physician of detrimental physical and psychological effects,
and medical risks); Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 448-49 (holding unreasonable the state's insistence that only a physician provide the information and counseling relevant to informed consent).
121. See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 450-51.
122. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67-75.
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only abortions, 2 3 the licensing of abortion clinics, 124 pathology reports,1 25 the presence of a second physician during the abortion, 12 6

detailed reporting and record-keeping by the physician,' 27 and restrictions on the choice of abortion technique. 12 8
Broadly speaking, these cases concerned medical decisionmaking and medical practice. All recognized that constitutional
protections can extend to medical decision-making and medical
practice (although some of the state restrictions were upheld as reasonable regulations that further a sufficiently compelling state interest). But, and this is the significance of these cases, all trace the
constitutional protections to a woman's fundamental constitutional
right to decide to have an abortion without undue interference by
the state.
There is no inconsistency, or even irony, between the Court's
extension of constitutional protections to a patient's choice of medical treatment to end the biological existence of a fetus, on the one
hand, and the conclusion that the same privacy right does not extend necessarily to the decision to terminate an incompetent patient's life-sustaining medical treatment. The Court in Roe declined
123. See, e.g., Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 510-19 (1983) (upholding hospitalization requirement by construing it broadly to include licensed outpatient clinic);
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983) (hospitalization requirement invalid); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 43139 (1983) (same); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973) (same).
124. See, e.g., Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 510-17 (requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in hospital valid as applied to licensed outpatient clinic that meets
reasonable regulations designed to protect the health of the pregnant woman); Ashcroft,
462 U.S. at 489-90 (certain regulations of even first-trimester abortions that " 'have no
significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right [to decide to have an abortion]
may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives' " (alterations by
the Court) (quoting Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 430)); Ragsdale v.
Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988),juris. postponed, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (agreeing to
review Illinois' comprehensive scheme for regulating abortion clinics), dismissed by consent
of parties, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 5818.
125. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 765-68 (1986) (holding unconstitutional requirement that the physician report
complications of the procedure, information about the patient, and the circumstances
under which the abortion was performed); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 79-81 (1978) (requirement that health care facilities and physicians keep records and
reports on abortions for seven years).
126. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 482-86, 505 (upholding second-physician requirement for second-trimester abortions).
127. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-66.
128. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (holding statute requiring
abortion technique that provides for the greatest chance of fetus being born alive to be
unconstitutionally vague); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-79 (holding legislative proscription of
saline method to be unreasonable regulation).
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to hold that a fetus.is a "person,"'' 29 and it consistently has adhered
to that position through its abortion decision last term in Webster.' 0
The only relevant person in the Court's abortion analysis is the
pregnant woman, whose life and health, not death, the Court has
sought to protect by keeping the process of choice as private as
possible.
In sum, none of the Supreme Court's privacy decisions has established the right at issue in Cruzan. Concededly, the Court has
been quite solicitous of the rights of a pregnant woman to make the
abortion decision for herself, with the assistance of medical professionals, and to obtain an abortion without undue restrictions. It
would strain the Court's language and logic, however, to divorce the
element of abortion from these cases and find a generalized right to
make significant medical decisions. Moreover, the carefully wrought
compromise that has produced majority decisions in these cases, evident in the increasingly narrow distinctions and the ever more slender majorities, should not be separated from the dominant concern
of Roe and its progeny: abortion.
None of this is to say that the Court could not conclude that the
right to decline life-sustaining medical treatment is a "fundamental"
right that enjoys qualified protection under the fourteenth amendment, only that it has not. Whether it should so conclude depends
upon the many policy issues considered in the next part of this
article.
II.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about
in the 'due process' area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula .... It will be achieved in this area, as

in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence
upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition
of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing
and preserving American freedoms.'
129. 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
130. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Webster majority reaffirmed the
conceptual framework of Roe (fundamental right/trimester-based sliding scale of interests), including the proposition that a fetus is not a person. See id. at 3049-54. It did so
despite the skepticism of a plurality of the Court, see id. at 3056-58, and the urging of
Justice Scalia. See id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Overview

Is the right of a PVS patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment a
fundamental right that should enjoy the protection of the fourteenth
amendment? This simple question simply begets more questions.
How can we tell if the fourteenth amendment recognizes such a fundamental right? To what kinds of sources will we look to find an
answer? How are institutional and political concerns to be balanced
against individual ones?
This part of the article proposes an answer to these questions.
In brief, my answer is this:
1. By most traditional measures-reason, tradition, natural
law, consensus-the right of an incompetent patient to refuse lifesustaining treatment does not enjoy enough support to be accurately labeled a "fundamental" right, at least not when the patient
is, like Nancy Beth Cruzan, in a persistent vegetative state and has
not executed an advance directive. More significantly, even if broad
agreement could be found for the general proposition that under
some circumstances incompetent patients should be able to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, there is not widespread agreement as to
many of the important procedural and substantive issues implicit in
that statement.
2. The Court should not extend federal constitutional protection to the right, because constitutionalization will cause more damage to evolving standards of medical practice and consensusbuilding on this important subject than it cures.
B.

The "Rights" Stuff

The Supreme Court's forays into fundamental-rights analysis
fall roughly into two groups. First are those cases involving democratic rights of political participation-having to do, for example,
with voter qualifications, 1 32 the weighing of votes, 3 3 apportionment
and districting, 134 and access to the ballot."3 5 These decisions fall
132. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 (1972) (durational residency requirement as a qualification to vote held unconstitutional); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419, 426 (1970) (state cannot treat persons on federal enclaves as residents for criminal,
taxing, and other purposes but as nonresidents for purposes of voting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding state's poll tax requirement
unconstitutional).
133. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (upholding supermajority requirement in bond referendum); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (Georgia's
county unit system held unconstitutional).
134. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (holding charge of partisan
gerrymandering in state legislative redistricting justiciable under fourteenth amend-
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into that category of cases, in Professor Ely's words, "fueled ...by a
desire to ensure that the political process ... was open to those of
' 36
all viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis."'
The second grouping of cases involves all other rights, not limited to rights of democratic participation, that the Court has identified as so important that state restrictions on them shall be given
"heightened judicial scrutiny." These rights include the right to
travel,13 7 the right to marry,' 8 and the broadly defined right of privacy.' 39 The Court also has held that some rights properly are not
included on this list of fundamental rights, including the right to
receive welfare;' 40 the right to basic levels of education,' 4 ' health
ment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (allowance for margin of error in
census figures does not justify departure from population equity in redistricting); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982) (multimember electoral system maintained for
racially discriminatory purpose held unconstitutional).
135. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (state may not condition
indigent candidate's access to ballot upon filing fees he cannot pay); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (complicated statute that kept independent and third-party candidates off the ballot held unconstitutional).
136. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74 (1980). Some of these decisions also might
fit within Professor Ely's second, related category of fundamental rights cases sounding
democratic, participational themes: "[T]he Court's message here was that insofar as
political officials had chosen to provide or protect X for some people (generally people
like themselves), they had better make sure that everyone was being similarly accommodated or be prepared to explain pretty convincingly why not." Id.
137. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding one year durational
residency requirement for commencing divorce proceedings); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (state's durational residency requirement as a condition of
welfare held unconstitutional); cf Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911
(1986) (plurality opinion) (regarding statute restricting veterans preference for state employment to veterans who were state residents when they entered service an invalid infringement of right to travel); id. at 912, 916 (Burger, CJ. & White, J., concurring)
(regarding statute as simply irrational).
138. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (statute prohibiting a noncustodial parent under a support order from marrying without court approval unnecessarily infringes on the fundamental right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12
(1967) (right to marry is a fundamental freedom that cannot be restricted by racial classifications); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941) (state sterilization sanction
infringed on the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation); cf.Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983) (a putative father has no absolute right to notice before his
child is adopted); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (a state may give an
unwed father less adoption veto power than it gives a married father).
139. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (differential effect of
various welfare programs subject to judicial review for mere rationality); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program deals with economics and social welfare and, absent invidious discrimination, is
subject to minimal scrutiny by reviewing court).
141. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973)
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care, 1 42 or housing; 43 and the right to government employment. 144
Most, if not all, of these exclusions from the list of fundamental
rights are explained, at least in part, by the Court's continued refusal to regard governmental classifications based upon wealth as
''suspect" classifications that can be justified only by reference to a
45
suitably "compelling" state interest. 1
How does the Court decide, with respect to this second group
of cases, which rights are "fundamental" in some important enough
way to warrant heightened judicial protection under the fourteenth
amendment? Members of the Court can seldom agree among themselves as to the precise source of these rights or the justification for
regarding them as "fundamental." The absence from the text of the
Constitution of any mention of these rights makes the job of justify(state's use of local property taxes to finance public education upheld under standard of
mere rationality).
142. In a series of abortion-funding cases, the Supreme Court held that neither the
federal government nor the states were required to pay for abortions. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977); Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977). Thus, even though abortion is a fundamental right (as is
the right to bear a child to birth), the government's refusal to fund abortions could be
justified as "rationally related" to the government's preference for childbirth over abortion. If abortion does not implicate a right to a minimal level of governmental assistance, then neither does health care generally. See generally Bovbjerg & Kopit, Coverage
and Carefor the Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 872-74

(1986).
143. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (exclusion of multifamily housing from village, absent proof of race-based animus, not subject to strict scrutiny); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1974) (village's zoning ordinance may provide only for housing that serves "traditional" families without infringing upon any fundamental interest); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (state constitutional provision calling for referendum and majority support among residents before low-income housing could be built; reviewed and
upheld under mere rationality standard ofjudicial review).
144. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979) (mandatory retirement age for
federal employee does not infringe fundamental right); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (mandatory retirement age for state employees does
not infringe fundamental right).
145. A classic exchange of articles debated the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find
a constitutional right to a subsistence level of governmental support for those necessities that enable a citizen to participate in the life of the society and to exercise other
fundamental rights. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protectingthe Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 41. A similarly spirited exchange considered the
question of a fundamental right to a certain level of health care. See Blumstein, Rationing
Medical Resources: A Constitutional,Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1345 (1981);
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1401
(1981); Blumstein, DistinguishingGovernment's Responsibility in Rationing Public and Private
Medical Resources, 60 TEX. L. REV. 899 (1982); Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care
Through Market Mechanisms: A Response to Professor Blumstein, 60 TEX. L. REv. 919 (1982).
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ing these decisions doctrinally difficult. The Court's tendency to
identify these rights and then, as in the case of privacy, to expand on
them, has thrown constitutional scholars into one of the most divi4 6
sive and enduring battles of the past thirty years.'
Professor Ely has surveyed the various rationales put forward to
explain and to justify the occasions when the Court has settled upon
one right or another as "fundamental."'
Ely is a skeptic, ' 8 but his
guide is useful. Concluding that all of these external sources of
value are wanting in one way or another, Ely discusses the personal
values of the deciding judge,' 4 9 natural law,' 50 neutral principles, 5 '
reason,152 tradition,"' consensus,' 5 4 and the judge's "best estimate
of what tomorrow's observers would be prepared to credit as progress."' 5' 5 In the course of his survey of constitutional law scholarship on the subject of "fundamental rights," Dean Choper produced
a similar list of approaches.' 56
Considered together, these sources might be expressed by
Dean Choper's necessarily loose phrase, "some evolving societal
consensus."' 5 7 Indeed, of all of the approaches on Ely's list, the
Supreme Court has appeared, especially in its recent cases, to rely
most explicitly upon consensus-focusing especially upon ostensibly objective indicia of society's "widely shared values," of conventional morality-which Ely says "turns out to be at the core of most
'fundamental values' positions."' 58 This article will apply this sense
146. One of the more recent and more public manifestations of this debate took the
form of hearings on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. See
Chemerinsky, The Constitution is Not "HardLaw "."The Bork Rejection and the Future of ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 29, 29 (1989).
147. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 136, at 43-72.
148. See, e.g., id. at 73 ("When we search for an external source of values with which to
fill in the Constitution's open texture, however-one that will not simply end up constituting the Court a council of legislative revision-we search in vain.").
149. Id.at 44-48.
150. Id. at 48-54.
151. Id. at 54-55.
152. Id. at 56-60.
153. Id. at 60-63.
154. Id. at 63-69.
155. Id. at 69.
156. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 73-75
(1980). The approaches include the development of "impersonal and durable principles;" resort to "our natural law inheritance," "natural rights," "conventional morality,"
"political morality," or "basic human values." Id. at 74.
157. Id. at 75. Dean Choper uses the term to describe the arguments of constitutional
law scholars in favor of the Justices' "defin[ition of] contemporary fundamental norms
that are manifested by some evolving societal consensus." Id.
158. J. ELY, supra note 136, at 63.
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of "consensus"-broad, inclusionary, historical, and progressiveto the constitutional issue raised by Cruzan.
First, however, some words of caution are in order. In Ely's
view, the use of consensus as a guide to discovering fundamental
values has three major flaws. The first is the assumption that consensus may exist at all, when in fact the United States may have devolved into a system of special interest domination through
in
temporary coalitions and legislative logrolling. 1 59 Developments
60
public choice theory tend to support this conclusion.
The second and more serious flaw focuses on our inability to
define the content and scope of a consensus, even if we assume the
possibility that a consensus may exist.' 6 1 As Ely puts it, "when one
gets down to cases, one finds much the same mix we found when the
reference was to 'natural law'-a mix of the uselessly general and
the controversially specific."' 6 2
The most serious flaw of all for Ely is the illogic of appealing to
majoritarian consensus on questions of fundamental rights. 163 One
reason for the appeal to fundamental rights might be to assure that
the majority's interest in a fundamental right is protected adequately, ajob the legislature clearly is better suited to perform. On
the other hand, if the reason for appealing to fundamental rights is
to protect the rights of an individual or minority from the tyranny of
the majority, it seems somewhat self-defeating to appeal to the sense
of the majority to determine whether such fundamental individual
or minority rights exist.' 64
Most of Ely's objections are illustrated by a recent privacy case
in which the Supreme Court justified its limitation upon the funda-

159. See id. at 63-64; see also id.at 64 (quoting Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law,
May 1977, at 35, 40) (emphasis added):
Latter-day disputes concerning the legitimate role of race in governmental decision-making, whether for purposes of segregation or affirmative action, or the
of life,
by abortion or euthaallowing the cessation of the possibility
legitimacy of the state's
nasia, also present differences of the greatest magnitude regarding conceptions
of justice.
160. For a clear and concise review of the public choice literature (and an excellent
bibliography), see Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988). See
also J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 265-306 (1965); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 263-70
HARPER'S,

(1979);

M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 111-67 (2d printing 1971).

161. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 136, at 64-69.
162. Id.at 64.
163. Id.at 68-69.
164. Id.at 69.
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mental right to privacy by noting the absence of consensus.

65

In

165. Another example of the Court's recurring appeal to statutory consensus to give
meaning to an open-textured constitutional provision-and of the conceptual difficulties
such an appeal raises-is the Court's decision this past term in Stanford v. Kentucky,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). This case did not involve a "fundamental rights" issue under
the fourteenth amendment, but rather the meaning of the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The specific
issue raised by Stanford was whether the execution of a prisoner convicted of a crime he
committed when he was still a minor constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment." 109
S. Ct. at 2974. For an answer to this question, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-Justice
majority, looked to the criminal laws of the states, which the Court regards as " '[f]irst'
among the ' "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."' " Id. at 2975 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))). Justice Scalia's review revealed that more
than half of the states that allow capital punishment allow its imposition upon 16- and
17-year-olds. Id. at 2975. Because the burden was on the defendant to establish a national consensus against the penalty, id. at 2977, the Court upheld Kentucky's death
penalty as applied to him. Id. at 2980.
The Court's approach in such cases ignores the possibility that "cruel and unusual
punishment" may not be synonymous with the majority's will. If fundamental values
have an historical dimension, for example, or could be based upon more transcendent
values (e.g., natural law principles), a present-day national majority is at best a very imperfect guide to decision. The Court, however, has answered this objection with a tautology: "cruel and unusual" means what a majority of the states today says it means. Id.
at 2974-75.
The case reveals some of the further difficulties inherent in the Court's consensusseeking methodology. The Court's conclusion that a majority of states do not prohibit
the execution of felons who were minors at the time they committed their offense rests
upon a shaky foundation. In fact, by the Court's own count, 25 states decline to impose
the death penalty upon 17-year-old offenders and 28 decline to impose it upon 16-yearold offenders. Id. at 2975. The ratio of states that permit executions of minor offenders
to those that do not produces a "majority of states" that permit the execution ofjuvenile
offenders only if the states that do not permit capital punishment at all are excluded
from the denominator. This difference between the majority and the four dissenting
Justices, see id. at 2982-83 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), illustrates Ely's point that defining precisely the propositions for which there is a consensus may be a hopeless undertaking.
Furthermore, the majority opinion falls into an egregious logical trap when it refuses to count states that prohibit all capital punishment in assessing the consensus position on the execution of minor offenders. See id. at 2975 n.2. Justice Scalia writes that
counting the prohibition states in the denominator "is rather like discerning a national
consensus that wagering on cockfights is inhumane by counting within that consensus
those States that bar all wagering." Id. at 2975 n.2. In Justice Scalia's example, states
that bar all wagering arguably should not be counted, because their motivation in adopting such a prohibition undoubtedly includes economic, social, and moral concerns about
gambling in general that tell us nothing about their attitudes toward the different issue
of cruelty to animals. By contrast, can it plausibly be maintained that states that have
banned capital punishment for all offenders also do not believe that capital punishment
is at least equally inappropriate for minor offenders and for adult offenders? The majority requires that these states somehow single out minor offenders for special protection-an impossibility for states that have banned capital punishment for all offenders-

132

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:103

Bowers v. Hardwick,'6 6 the Court concluded that prior cases "would
[not] extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts
of consensual sodomy."' 6 7 The Court reached this conclusion by
noting that "[s]odomy was a criminal offense at common law and
was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights"' 68 and "[i]n 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 states in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws.'

1 69

The Court's reliance upon historical con-

sensus presumably is justified by one of the Court's alternative definitions of "fundamental rights": "those liberties that are 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "170
Yet, the Bowers Court could not conclude with any real justification that consensual sodomy-along with other decisions that profoundly touch individual notions of sexuality and identity such as
contraception and abortion-is not included within our core understanding of "privacy rights." The Court's notion of consensus on
this subject lacks credibility when twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia have criminalized sodomy but twenty-six states have
not.17 1 Whatever the level of consensus in the past, the Justices'
figures illustrate a clear historical shift away from criminalizing sodomy. Yet that trend was not factored into the majority's discussion
of consensus. For that matter, it is difficult to say how a historical
shift in attitudes should be factored into the Court's analysis.
Finally, "consensus" requires an issue, a proposition, that a majority can agree on, and that issue or proposition should be relevant
to the case at hand. Imagine that a representative sampling of citizens or legislators was asked, "Should the constitution protect conand concludes from the failure of those states to do so that they must not believe that
capital punishment for minor offenders is "cruel and unusual" punishment.
Moreover, as the dissent points out, id. at 2983 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting), 18 of the states in which minor offenders can be executed have
not reached that position by explicitly considering the issue. Execution of minor offenders is a possibility in those states, not because any statute provides for such executions in
so many words, and not necessarily because the majority of citizens or their elected
representatives consciously reached a consensus on the subject, but because juvenile
offenders can be transferred from juvenile court to be tried as adults and their capital
punishment statutes do not distinguish between adult and minor offenders. See id. The
question whether these states should count toward a consensus is not answered easily.
166. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
167. Id. at 192.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 192-93.
170. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
171. See id. at 198 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sensual homosexual sodomy?"' 7 2 and another sampling was asked,
"Should the constitution protect the right to be left alone1 7 3 or the
right to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of your own
home?"' 74 How would the answers to either set of questions provide an answer to whether the fundamental right to privacy permitted Georgia's punishment of Michael Hardwick?
The foregoing discussion illustrates how tenuous-as a matter
of logic, history, and constitutional doctrine-the Court's reliance
upon consensus can be as a guide to identifying and defining fundamental rights. Having charted a course in this area that relies upon
consensus, however, the Court appears unwilling or unable to turn
back, and it could not do so without undoing settled law. For example, Roe v. Wade and its progeny depend upon a non-statutory consensus for their conclusion that the constitution protects a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion.' 75 With all of these difficulties
in mind, we turn next to the question whether any such consensus
exists on the question of an incompetent patient's right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment.
C.

Terminating Treatment

"No answer is what the wrong question begets

.

172. This is the majority's version of the relevant privacy issue. See id. at 192.
173. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
174. See id. at 208.
175. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-48 (1973). In addition to surveying ancient
attitudes, the Hippocratic Oath, common law, and English statutory law, the majority
considered both historical and present-day American law and the positions of the American Medical, American Public Health, and American Bar Associations on the issue. Id.
Although a substantial minority of the Justices appear to be ready to overrule Roe, a
majority of Justices is unwilling to do so. Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3056-57 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., White & Kennedy, JJ., plurality
opinion) and id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) with id. at 3058, 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), id at 3067-79 (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) and id. at 3079, 3079-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 103 (1962). The utility of this quotation was first suggested by reading John
Hart Ely's chapter on "Discovering Fundamental Values" inJ. ELY, supra note 136, at 43.
For Professor Bickel, "to seek in historical materials relevant to the framing of the Constitution, or in the language of the Constitution itself, specific answers to specific present
problems is to ask the wrong question. With adequate scholarship, the answer that must
emerge in the vast majority of cases is no answer." A. BICKEL, supra, at 102. For Professor Ely, to look outside the Constitution, its structure, and its functions in an attempt to
identify fundamental values by consulting the value system represented by the judge,
natural law, neutral principles, tradition, and popular consensus, is also to ask the wrong
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The question of the legal status of an incompetent patient's
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment produces different
answers depending upon how the question is framed. Consider, for
example, the states' "living will" legislation. As of 1988, thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia had enacted some type of statute
that empowered a competent patient to execute an advance medical
directive that would allow life-sustaining treatment to be withheld
or withdrawn in the event the patient becomes incompetent and is
terminally ill.' 7 7 At one level of generality, these thirty-nine statutes
reflect a national consensus (based upon the agreement of nearly
eighty percent of the states) that life-sustaining treatment can be
withheld or withdrawn from incompetent patients, at least under
some limited circumstances, when the patient has executed an advance written directive.
Only two of these state statutes, however-Arkansas 17 8 and,
very recently, Texas 17 9 -would

appear to permit patients who are

question. J. ELY, supra note 136, at 43-72. As the discussion that follows should illustrate, the question posed in the text is the wrong question for other reasons as well.
177. See A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 359 (1989) (table). The statutes include: ALA.
CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to 18.12-100 (1986);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-17-101 to 2717-203 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to 15-18-113 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to
19a-575 (West Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2508 (1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-2401 to 2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to 765.15 (West 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (1985 & Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to
327D-27 (1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-811-1 to 16-8-11-22 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to 144A.11 (West
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 65-28,109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10 (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to
2931 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to
459.055 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-206 (1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540 to 449.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to 137-H:16 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-10
(1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to
3011 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to 97.090 (1983 & Supp. 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to 44-77-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-101 to 32-11-110 (Supp. 1989); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 75-2-1118 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992 (1988 &
Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.15 (West 1989);
WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to 35-22-109 (1988).
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-202 (1987); see Comment, Comparison of the Living Will
Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105, 111 n.43, 123 (1988).
179. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Texas' Natural Death Act defines a "qualified patient" as one who has been "diagnosed . . .to be
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not in a terminal condition to execute advance written directives.
Thus, with respect to PVS patients with no other illness or injury
" id. § 2(6). A "qualified patient," unlike any
afflicted with a terminal condition ..
other competent adult patient, can give an unwritten directive to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. Id. § 3(b). The Natural Death Act, however, was amended in
June 1989 by S.B. No. 1785. See 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 674 (Vernon) (effective Sept.
1, 1989). S.B. No. 1785 amended, among other things, the statutory definition of "terminal condition," and thus amended indirectly the definition of "qualified patient."
"Terminal condition" is now defined to be "an incurable or irreversible condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness, which, without [regardless of] the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and
where the application of life-sustaining procedures serves only to postpone the moment
of death of the patient." TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(added language in italics; deleted language in brackets). While the former version of
this definition literally limited the class of "qualified patients" to those as to whom lifesustaining treatment would have been futile, the new version should cover a PVS patient, like Nancy Beth Cruzan, who-with life-sustaining treatment-may live another 30
years.
This conclusion is bolstered by the changes S.B. No. 1785 made to the statutory
definition of "life-sustaining procedure":
a medical procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which, when applied to a
qualified patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death
and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, noted in the qualified
patient's medical records, death is imminent whether or not such procedures
are utilized or will result within a relatively short time without application of such procedures.
Id. § 1(4) (added language in italics).
If withheld, artificial ventilation, for example, or artificial nutrition and hydration
arguably qualifies as a procedure without which death "will result within a relatively
short time." The imprecision inherent in this standard leaves some room for doubt,
however, whether a death that can be expected a few days to a week or more after the
removal of a feeding tube would occur "within a relatively short time."
Some further doubt also exists as to whether the artificial nutrition and hydration
that keep Nancy Beth Cruzan alive are "life-sustaining procedures'; at all under the
Texas Natural Death Act. The statutory definition ends with this sentence: " 'Life-sustaining procedure' shall not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort or care or alleviate
pain." Id. § 2(4). Food and water often are regarded as fundamental aspects of comfort
and care, laden with important communal and social symbolism, that puts them in a
seemingly unique class of medical treatment. This makes food and water different in
important ways from a ventilator or the techniques of cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
See, e.g., Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 22; see also,
e.g., Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Dec. 1984, at 11, 13 (feeding is "ordinary human care [that] is not given as treatment for
any life-threatening disease"); Steinbrook & Lo, Artificial Feeding-SolidGround, Not a Slippery Slope, 318 NEw ENG.J. MED. 286, 286 (1988) ("Many physicians consider that basic,
humane care requires that patients always be given food and water, because they represent love and concern for the helpless."). But see, e.g., Cassell, Life as a Work of Art, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 35, 35 ("there is no theoretical difference between the
refusal to eat and the refusal of any other treatment") (emphasis omitted); Lynn & Childress, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Food and Water?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at
17, 21 ("medical nutrition and hydration do not appear to be. distinguishable in any
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(and whose life expectancy may be measured in years or decades),
the vast majority of these statutes do not confer a right to have lifesustaining treatment withdrawn on the basis of a living will.
"Terminal condition" is, of course, a nontechnical term that is
capable of being infused with different meanings. For example, it
does not specify a period of time within which death is expected to
occur. 8 ' Even if this limitation can be finessed by physicians acting
within their reasonable clinical, professional judgment, however, it
is difficult to find in these statutes a national consensus in support of
the termination of life-sustaining treatment for patients, like Nancy
Beth Cruzan, in a persistent vegetative state. This is because the
medical needs of such patients, absent infections and the like, are
limited to nutrition and hydration (as well as basic nursing care),
and nineteen of these thirty-nine statutes do not permit nourishment to be withheld pursuant to a living will.' 8 ' Commentators are
dramatically and heatedly in disagreement over the issue, as well. 182
The search for a national consensus on the treatment issues for
PVS patients, however, need not be limited to the legislative enactments of the various states. There are at least two reasons why this
should be so. First, most patients, like Nancy Beth Cruzan, do not
execute living wills before they become incompetent to make their
own medical care decisions. 8 3 Thus, "living will" legislation is only
an indirect source of guidance in cases similar to hers. Second, the
Natural Death Acts and "living will" statutes generally are regarded
morally relevant way from other life-sustaining medical treatments that may on occasion
be withheld or withdrawn").
When asked, however, whether artificial nutrition is a "life-sustaining procedure"
under the Texas Natural Death Act, the state's attorney general stated that it may be, but
that the question of "whether it will serve to artificially prolong the moment of death is a
question which depends upon the expertise of the medical profession for its resolution
in each individual case." Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. No. JM-837 (Dec. 28, 1987).
180. Natural Death Acts and other "living will" statutes usually refer to death occurring "imminently" or within a relatively short period of time. See A. MEISEL, supra note
177, at 366-67 & n.50.
181. See Comment, supra note 178, at 123-29 (table); see also A. MEISEL, supra note 177,
at 369-70; Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health (U.S. No. 88-1503) (Dec. 6, 1989) (Sol. Gen. Starr). Thirty-three state statutes
do not permit comfort or care to be withheld pursuant to a living will. See Comment,
supra note 178, at 123-29 (table). In an authoritative study of living will legislation, Leslie Pickering Francis found that the trend in recent years has been to exclude nutrition
and hydration from the scope of treatment that may be refused. See Francis, The Evanescence of Living Wills, 14J. CONTEMP. L. 27, 33-35 (1988).
182. See, e.g., the disparity among commentators discussed supra note 179 regarding
whether nutrition and hydration should ever be withheld.
183. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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as having added rights to those that existed at common law, not as
8 4 Consequently, a
being in derogation of those pre-existing rights.'
complete picture of the national consensus, if any, on this issue
must look to other statutes, the case law, and the commentary that
has come out of this area. Although there is no logical reason why
the Supreme Court could not look to state and lower federal court
decisions to determine whether there exists a common-law right to
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn or withheld, it would not
be helpful in this case.
The doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment, for example, does not help in the search for a consensus concerning medical decision-making for incompetent patients such as Nancy Beth
18 5
Cruzan. There undoubtedly is widespread support in the courts
for the doctrine, with its twin duties to inform and to obtain consent
86
and its correlative right to refuse consent.1 Its acceptance within
the medical profession, however, has been somewhat grudging, and
fidelity to the dictates of informed consent in the clinical setting remains a matter not wholly free from doubt. 187 Finally, there is a lack
of realism in looking to informed consent, which posits the right of
competent patients to make their own medical treatment decisions,
as a basis for finding consensus concerning the rights of incompe88
tent patients to choose a certain course of medical treatment.'
The "right to die" cases are also an unsatisfactory source of
consensus.' 89 Professor Alan Meisel's recent summary of these
cases deserves to be quoted in full:
184. See A. MEISEL, supra note 177, at 358, 360 ("All courts that have considered the
issue have held that natural death acts are not intended to preempt common-law rights
to make advance directives").
185. Although roughly half of the states now have informed consent statutes, see C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE POLICY AND LAw 852-53 (1988), the doctrine has commonlaw origins. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
186. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 7, at 190.
187. "In medical practice, the right to refuse treatment often is ignored because it is
inconsistent with the history and ethos of the medical profession," id.; "If the courts
have been caught between the values of autonomy and health, it should come as no
surprise that the medical profession has been even more torn by the dilemma of patient
refusal." Id. at 194; see also J. KATZ, supra note 7, at 85 (physicians are resistent to informed consent doctrine).
188. This idea is developed more fully later in this article. See infra notes 230-236 and
accompanying text.
189. But see Keiner v. Community Convalescent Center (In re Longeway), 1989 Ill.
LEXIS 152, *4 (noting strong support in the case law for the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures, including nutrition and hydration). The Longeway court apparently was referring to an emerging consistency of result, not rationale.
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Although the case law since Quinlan has added some clarity,
it has also added a great deal of confusion to the issue of
the right to die. A large majority of jurisdictions still have
no case law on the issue. Looking to the law of other jurisdictions is complicated by the fact that it may be unsettled,
incomplete, or conflicting. Furthermore, judicial decisions
frequently raise more questions than they answer. The
New Jersey courts, for example, despite repeated attempts
to put the matter to rest with far-reaching if not seemingly
definitive opinions, have appeared to be seriously frustrated in their efforts. Indeed, the experience in those jurisdictions (California, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and New York) that have experienced relatively frequent
litigation over these matters has been that litigation raises
more questions and breeds more litigation rather than definitive resolution. 190

Professor George Annas, who has been a rather consistent defender
of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,' 9 ' would agree. He
describes the decision as to "[w]ho has the right to refuse lifesaving
treatment for an incompetent patient as one of the most controversial areas of medical jurisprudence."'' 9 2 As anyone who has attempted to wade through the opinions knows, this is a field in which
distinctions and contradictions abound.
Nor, for that matter, has the medical profession itself developed
a consensus as to the proper method of dealing with PVS patients.
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in Brophy v.
New England Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. ," "There is substantial disagreement in the medical community over the appropriate medical
action. "'s4 The steady stream of books and articles about the "right
190. A. MEISEL, supra note 177, at 12-13. In a recent "Council Report," two councils
of the American Medical Association attempted to distill those basic propositions on
which most courts seem to agree, but the councils noted "the different legal rulings in
various states" and concluded that "the law in this'area turns very heavily on court cases
and legislation in the various states." Council Report, supra note 28, at 428, 429.
191. See G. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE 259-322 (1988) (a collection of his well-known

essays, mostly from The Hastings Center Report).
192. G. ANNAS, supra note 47, at 204-05; see also Otten, In Latest Cases, Consensus Fades on
Right to Die, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1988, at BI, col. 6 (courts and legislatures split as to
whether designated surrogate can make decision to refuse lifesaving treatment for incompetent patient).
193. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
194. Id. at 441, 497 N.E.2d at 639. But see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA
OF PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES: 1988, at 23-25
(indicating that three-fourths of the physicians surveyed favored the withdrawal of life
support systems, including nutrition and hydration, from the hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose patients if they or their families request it).
SURVEYS
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to die" is a further illustration of the lack of general agreement on
even first principles, let alone the details of the implementation of
such principles.
As evidence of the deep, fundamental disagreements that so
mark this area, consider the status of the debate over active and passive euthanasia. If there is a dominant position with respect to these
terms, it is that passive euthanasia may be ethically and legally permissible under certain circumstances, while active euthanasia is not
ethically permissible" 5 and constitutes homicide, at least under
The distinction between active and passive
some circumstances.'
euthanasia typically is seen as a difficult one to defend logically 9 7
but important to retain for legal and policy reasons. 19 8 As the con195. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 60-82, 63 (1983) ("society ought [not] to condone the deliberate use of
poisons or similar lethal agents"); HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 6 (1987) [hereinafter HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES] ("[o]ur society forbids assisting suicide or active euthanasia"); Dr. Nancy E. Dickey, 256J. A.M.A. 471 (letter to the editor stating the opinion of
American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs that discontinuation of life-sustaining medical treatment in case of patients whose "coma is beyond
doubt irreversible" and patients who are terminally ill whose death is imminent is ethical; however, physician "should not intentionally cause death").
196. See generally Note, CriminalLiability, supra note 7 (note surveying criminal liability
for suicide assistance and suggesting statutory response).
197. See, e.g., H. KUHSE, THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE DOCTRINE IN MEDICINE 31-81, 123-46
(1987); J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 78-116 (1986).
198. See, e.g., HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 195, at 6 (the prohibition of
active euthanasia "serves to sustain the societal value of respect for life and to provide
some safeguards against abuse of the authority to take actions that shorten life"); N.Y.
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: MAKING DECISIONS & APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT 41 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. TASK FORCE]
("While the moral distinction between assisting to die and withdrawing treatment is
[a]ll the Task Force members believe that as a
hard to discern in certain cases .....
matter of public policy the taking of human life must not be granted legal sanction.").
In addition, most state natural death acts and living will statutes retain the distinction in their recognition of a patient's right to avoid "death prolonging" or "death delaying" treatment. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1989);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103 (7) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(d), (g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.2(5)(b) (West 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(4) (Supp. 1989). Implicit in these provisions is the conclusion that, when life-sustaining procedures are withheld or withdrawn under the circumstances described in the statutes, the cause of death
is the patient's underlying condition, not the non-treatment.
Arguably, the distinction between passive and active euthanasia already has become
dangerously blurred, if not altogether obliterated, by court decisions that permit the
removal of feeding tubes from incompetent patients. This belief is presumably one of
the reasons why approximately half of the states' Natural Death Acts and living will statutes prohibit the removal of food and water from qualified patients. See supra note 181
and accompanying text; see also A. MEISEL, supra note 177, at 129 & n.91 (citing cases); Y.
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troversy over the following article in the Journalof the American Medical Association (JAMA) illustrates, however, a strong riptide of dissent
runs just below the seemingly placid surface of this general

agreement.
In 1988,JAMA published It's Over, Debbie,' 9 9 an anonymous account of a gynecology resident's decision to inject a young cancer
patient with a lethal dose of morphine. The circumstances surrounding the resident's decision to administer the lethal injection
were so unusual, 20 0 some readers were tempted to conclude that the
story was apocryphal.20 1
In a subsequent editorial defending
JAMA's decision to print the article, the journal's editor, Dr. George
Lundberg, stated that there are "at least six identifiable major types
of euthanasia, ' 20 2 beginning with "passive," ending with "active,"
and with at least four presumably intermediate types in between.20 3
Kamisar, supra note 16, at 10 ("the 'feeding tube' cases have seriously undermined
whatever distinction once existed between 'killing' and 'letting die' ").
199. 259J. A.M.A. 272 (1988) (anonymous).
200. Apart from the decision to perform active euthanasia, some of the details of the
story were too strange to be believed easily. The physician involved made the decision
in the middle of the night, while still drowsy from sleep, about a patient not his own, and
without consulting the patient's attending physician. The article suggested that the patient was in unrelenting pain that could not be managed with a nonlethal dose of painkiller, suggesting an almost shocking level of unfamiliarity with basic principles of pain
control. The patient's only words were, "Let's get this over with," an ambiguous statement at best that the resident interpreted to mean "Please end my life." Id.
201. See, e.g., Gaylin, Kass, Pellegrino & Siegler, Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 J. A.M.A.
2139 (1988) [hereinafter Gaylin]; Dr. Verne M. Marshall, 260J. A.M.A. 787 (1988) (letter to the editor). Another correspondent suggested that the story's reference to an
alcohol drip for sedation might place the date of the events some 25 years ago, a time
"without all the knowledge that we now have about pain control .... [and] public
scrutiny was not as intense as it is now..
Dr. Sheldon T. Berkowitz, 260J. A.M.A. 788
(1988) (letter to the editor).
202. Lundberg, 'It's Over, Debbie' and the Euthanasia Debate, 259J. A.M.A. 2142, 2143
(1988).
203. Lundberg's categories are:
1. Passive. A physician may choose not to treat acute bronchopneumonia
or sepsis in a person with Alzheimer's disease or may not resuscitate a patient
with carcinomatosis who has experienced cardiac arrest.
2. Sentipassive. A physician may withhold medical treatment, such as nutrition or fluids, from a person in coma from postnecrotic cirrhosis and hepatoma
with cerebral metastases.
3. Semiactive. A physician may disconnect a ventilator from a patient who
is in a stable, vegetative state from massive cerebral infarction and has no hope
of regaining consciousness.
4. Accidental ("Double-effect"). A physician may administer a narcotic to relieve bone pain in a patient with terminal metastatic breast cancer and the narcotic may incidentally depress respiration sufficiently to cause death directly or
to facilitate the development of fatal bronchopneumonia.
5. Suicidal. A person with metastatic lung cancer may intentionally over-
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Lundberg regarded only "active euthanasia," such as that performed by the resident in It's Over, Debbie, to be both illegal and
"outside the bounds of thousands of years of medical tradition. '"204
William Gaylin and three other well-known medical ethicists agreed,
condemning the resident for committing premeditated murder and
"behav[ing] altogether in a scandalously unprofessional and unethical manner.- 20 5 Kenneth Vaux, however, chose to recharacterize
the resident's act as "morally acceptable double-effect euthanasia." ' 20 6 This disagreement might be written off merely as evidence
of the difficult moral distinction between passive euthanasia (and its
moral equivalents) and active euthanasia, since Vaux avoided the label of "active euthanasia" in his analysis of the resident's conduct.
But Vaux's disagreement with the other writers is more fundamental. He stated: "[W]hile positive euthanasia must be proscribed in
principle, in exceptional cases it may be abided in deed.- 20 7
Other authors, perhaps less cagey than Vaux, have supported
the proposition that active euthanasia should not even be proscribed in principle. Thus, in a famous essay, James Rachels wrote:
"[T]here is really no moral difference between the two, considered
in themselves (there may be important moral differences in some
cases in their consequences, but, as I pointed out, these differences
may make active euthanasia, and not passive euthanasia, the morally
preferable option)."2 0 8 For its time, Rachels' argument was a notably minority position. Four years later, Joseph Fletcher argued
forcefully in favor of "active or direct euthanasia, which helps the
patient to die, not merely the passive or indirect form of euthanasia
which 'lets the patient go' by simply withholding life-preserving
dose on alcohol and barbiturates, causing his or her own death; the drugs may
have been provided by a physician.
6. Active. A physician may administer a large, surely fatal overdose of
morphine or potassium in a patient with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome who has widespread Kaposi's sarcoma, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia,
and the dementia of cerebral toxoplasmosis.

Id.; cf.J.

FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

153-54 (1979) (identify-

ing five categories of "elective death").
204. See Lundberg, supra note 202, at 2143.
205. Gaylin, supra note 201, at 2139.
206. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Aercy Killing and the Good Death, 259J. A.M.A. 2140, 2140
(1988). For a brief description of "double-effect" euthanasia, see supra note 203.
207. Vaux, supra note 206, at 2141.
208. Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 78, 80 (1975) (emphasis in original). Active euthanasia would be preferable, in Rachels' view, when it
would eliminate prolonged pain and suffering that would be suffered by a patient as the
result of some form of passive euthanasia. Id. at 78.
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treatments. 20 9 His argument ended with the prediction, not quite
fully realized in 1990, that "other forms [of euthanasia than indirect
and involuntary euthanasia] will one day be socially accepted and
enacted into law." ' 21 0 Others have since embraced the RachelsFletcher position that no principled basis exists between active and
passive euthanasia and that active euthanasia is, therefore, morally
defensible. 2 1
After the infamous "Debbie" piece appeared, physicians and
laypeople wrote toJAMA and expressed opinions that cover the en2
tire spectrum from Gaylin to Rachels.21 As the Vaux article inti2
mates, 1 it may well be that there exists a significant chasm between
2 4
medical ethical theory and medical practice in fact. i The differences of opinion in this area have led to recent scholarly efforts to
redefine the terms of the debate in an attempt to clarify the moral
21 5 In the spring of
terms over which there is so much disagreement.
1989, an influential group of physicians added their voices to the
debate by concluding that physician-assisted suicide is not unethical. 2 i 6 Stopping short of a similar endorsement of active euthanasia, the group wrote that physicians "should not feel morally
coerced to participate in [euthanasia] .... [T]he medical profession
and the public will continue to debate the role that euthanasia may
209. J. FLETCHER, supra note 203, at 149.
210. Id. at 158.
211. See, e.g., Kuhse, The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 145, 145 (1986) (patients should sometimes be allowed to die).
212. See Letters: It's Almost Over-More Letters on Debbie, 260 J. A.M.A. 787, 787-89
(1988); Letters: It's Over, Debbie, 259J. A.M.A. 2094, 2094-98 (1988).
213. See Vaux, supra note 206, at 2141.
214. Although a 1988 California initiative to legalize euthanasia failed to obtain
enough signatures to get onto the California ballot, it may have "failed because of organizational problems, not voter sentiment. Public opinion polls have shown fairly consistently that about three fifths of the American public favor legalizing euthanasia under
certain conditions ....

Angell, Euthanasia, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1348, 1349 (1988).

The California initiative would have limited euthanasia to those who are "terminally ill,
with a life expectancy of less than six months with or without medical treatment." Id.
The initiative also would have permitted a competent patient to authorize euthanasia by
durable power of attorney if the qualifying conditions for euthanasia occurred within
seven years. Id.
215. See, e.g., Devettere, Reconceptualizing the EuthanasiaDebate, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 145, 148-51 (1989) (classifying all decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment
within a "simple descriptive schema" consisting of four catcgories: performing or not
performing actions thought to prevent death and performing or not performing actions
thought to cause death).
216. Wanzer, Federman, Adelstein, Cassel, Cassem, Cranford, Hook, Lo, Moertel,
Safar, Stone & van Eys, The Physician 's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989).
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have in the treatment of the terminally or hopelessly ill patient. '"217
Answers may not be obvious, but the lack of consensus is.
The shifting attitudes toward passive and active euthanasia
should be of great concern to the Court as it considers whether and
to what extent it should approve the withholding or withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration from Nancy Beth Cruzan. We in the United
States already have seen a quite dramatic change in attitudes toward
nutrition and hydration, from 1976, when Karen Ann Quinlan's father (who already had petitioned to have his daughter's respirator
turned off) reacted with horror at the suggestion to remove her
nasogastric tube ("Oh no, that is her nourishment")2 1 to the present, when "courts ...typically do not give th[e] fact [that nutrition
and hydration are being removed] particular note. ' ' 2 ' 9 How long

will it take for our acceptance of passive euthanasia to lead to a
grudging and limited acceptance of active euthanasia, followed by a
greater willingness to tolerate active euthanasia?
Although it is fashionable in some circles to sneer at slippery
slope arguments such as this, one should not do so unthinkingly in
this area. Those who support passive euthanasia but oppose active
euthanasia, for example, believe the two forms of euthanasia to be
different and that the differences are morally significant. But, as
Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed out, most slippery slope
arguments are based upon the potentially valid assumption of the
inability of future decision-makers to understand or defend distinctions we deem important today. 220 The ability or willingness of future decision-makers to maintain the active-passive distinction still
thought by most observers to be significant depends upon at least
two factors: the logical strength of the distinction and the effect that
experience has upon our willingness to maintain the distinction. As
to the former, one only need read some of the arguments currently
being put forth by proponents of the active-passive distinction to
wonder how long the arguments will satisfy the proponents them22
selves, let alone those who follow some years later. '
217. Id. at 849.
218. See Ramsey, ProlongingDying: Not Medically Indicated, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.

1976, at 14, 16.
219. M. HALL & I. ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 331 (1990).

220. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381-83 (1985); see also infra note
251.
221. The editorialists for The New Republic, for example, recently defended the utility
of the active-passive distinction by reference to "the fact that active euthanasia, unlike
passive euthanasia, brings with it many dicey procedural questions and, ultimately, a
slippery slope." Feeling No Pain, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 27, 1989, at 9, 10. The proce-
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As for the effect that our experience with legalized passive euthanasia might have on our ability to maintain moral distinctions we
currently believe are significant, a few comments may be made.
First, the history of our activities and beliefs concerning the ethics of
death and dying is a history of lost distinctions of former significance.2 Slippery slopes simply may go with this psychological and
emotional territory. Moreover, the courts (and the Supreme Court
in particular) cannot be unmindful of their influence not only as definers of conventional morality but as shapers of it as well. The role
of Dutch courts in moving the Netherlands toward legalized active
euthanasia provides an example. 223 As Professor Tribe recently has
noted, the courts and the legal system affect reality by changing the
conditions of our relations with one another and the state,2 24 yet the
courts (or at least the Supreme Court) repeatedly fail to take this
into account when they address subsequent legal issues without recognizing the extent to which their own past decisions fundamentally
altered the experiences, expectations, and conduct of the parties.
Again, the Netherlands may provide an example. One of the
essential preconditions for the use of active euthanasia by a Dutch
physician is that the patient freely request the termination of his or
her life, 22 a precondition that proponents of active euthanasia in
the United States probably would accept. The notion of free choice,
however, becomes troubling as soon as the euthanasia option becomes legalized. As Professor Yale Kamisar noted thirty years ago:
dural issues included how to tell when death is imminent and how to gauge "the sincerity [and] the durability of the patient's expressed willingness to die." Id. The "slippery
slope question [is:] Once we sanction euthanasia, what is to stop it from entering the
domain of cold cost-benefit calculations?" Id. Both the procedural issues and the slippery slope question, however, apply with equal force to active and passive euthanasia,
both of which hasten death (that is the point of euthanasia) and differ only in their
means of doing so. If those issues are insufficient to warn us of the use of passive euthanasia, how long will they be effective as bulwarks against active euthanasia? In his critique of rights-based arguments in the debate over neonatal euthanasia, Professor Carl
Schneider suggests that the rights discourse is unavoidably complicated by "genuine,
numerous, and steep.., slippery slopes." Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Eutha-

nasia, 76

CALIF.

L.

REV.

151, 166-73 (1988).

222. See M. HALL & I. ELLMAN, supra note 219, at 241-51, 252-55, 330-37 (discussions
of the vanishing legal or moral significance of such distinctions as withholding versus
withdrawing treatment, ordinary versus extraordinary treatment, and nutrition/hydration versus other types of treatment, as well as the unstable distinction as a
matter of logic and pragmatism between active and passive euthanasia).
223. See de Wachter, Active Euthanasiain the Netherlands, 262J. A.M.A. 3316, 3317-18
(1989).
224. See generally Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
225. See de Wachter, supra note 223, at 3317.
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Even if the patient's choice could be said to be "clear
and incontrovertible," do not other difficulties remain? Is
this the kind of choice, assuming that it can be made in a
fixed and rational manner, that we want to offer a gravely ill
person? Will we not sweep up, in the process, some who
are not really tired of life, but think others are tired of
them; some who do not really want to die, but who feel
they should not live on, because to do so when there looms
the legal alternative of euthanasia is to do a selfish or cowardly act? Will not some feel an obligation to have themselves "eliminated" in order that funds allocated for their
terminal care might be better used by their families or, financial worries aside, in order to relieve their families of
226
the emotional strain involved?

In short, just as technology often has seemed to have its own moral
imperative ("If it is available, it should be used"), options given the
blessings of the law may well become not only thinkable but presumptively so. For the reasons explained in the remainder of this
article, the Supreme Court should let these issues continue to develop at the grassroots, with the vigorous debate and the cross-fertilization from one state to another that can happen best, if at all,
with the least control from the Court. This seems so at least until
the dynamic and fluid "consensus" on these issues coalesces around
both conclusions and rationales acceptable to at least the proponents of passive or active euthanasia themselves. Two recent commentaries on the Cruzan case by authors who criticize 2 2 7 and
approve 228 the Missouri Supreme Court's decision support this cautious approach. Both suggest that recognizing a constitutional right
to die in a case such as Cruzan will seriously threaten the rights of
incapacitated patients.2 2 9 One or the other of these positions is
likely to be correct, and the resolution of this most difficult of
226. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "'Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REV. 969, 990 (1958).
227. See Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can Exercise an
IncapacitatedPatient's Right to Die, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 389 (1989).
228. See Meilaender, The Cruzan Decision: A Moral Commentary, MIDWEST MED. ETHICS,
Winter-Spring 1989, at 6.
229. Professor Ellman, who believes that the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is
sometimes appropriate, argues that the claim of a personal right of autonomy on behalf
of incapacitated patients such as Nancy Beth Cruzan rests on a legal fiction that may lead
to the wrong result in cases in which the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not in
the best interests of the patient. See Ellman, supra note 227, at 394-99. Professor Meilaender, on the other hand, opposes all withdrawals of nutrition and hydration from
incompetent patients and applauds the Missouri Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a
right to die in Cruzan. See Meilaender, supra note 228, at 7-9.
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problems will not be furthered by Supreme Court activism in this
case.
Perhaps it has been difficult thus far to discern a consensus in
support of the notion that the right of privacy protects an incompetent patient's autonomy because, once a patient is incompetent (at
least once irreversibly so), his or her status is incompatible with notions of autonomy and personal decision-making. Certainly when
there is no living will or other advance directive (which is most of
the time), it should be clear that it is not the patient but someone
else-a guardian, perhaps, or attorney-in-fact-who is making his or
her medical decisions. The surrogate decision-maker may look for
evidence of what the patient would have wanted her treatment to be,
or-more perilously-for evidence of what the patient would want
now if only she could regain consciousness for a moment.2 3 ° It is at
least curious that the claim of a privacy right is made for this treatment decision, which is made for the patient by another, even
though the opportunity for consultation with the patient is only
symbolically present and the patient's control over the decision is
possible only because of the acquiescence of others.2 3 '
Even when the incompetent patient has left an advance directive (whether written, in the case of a living will, or oral), or recently
has made reasonably concrete and explicit statements about treatment preferences should he or she become incompetent, it is not,
strictly speaking, the PVS patient who chooses to terminate treatment. Someone else makes that non-treatment decision for him or
her. More specifically, it is someone other than the patient who decides that the living will, oral directive, or clear statement should be
given effect.
For example, suppose someone executed a living will three
years before an accident left her in a persistent vegetative state. The
230. Of course, this would require the surrogate to assess the patient's earlier statements and actions to determine what she would have said then about her supposed
wishes now. This, in turn, assumes that patients are capable of imagining when they are
competent what their wishes for treatment would be after they became incompetent.
Professor Rebecca Dresser has argued forcefully against this assumption. Dresser, Life,
Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ.
L. REV. 373, 379-81 (1986).
This "substituted judgment" standard has been criticized by some, see E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN
HEALTH CARE (1988); Dresser, supra, at 374-82, and some courts have discarded it, at
least when evidence concerning the wishes of the patient is lacking, in favor of an explicit best-interests-of-the-patient analysis. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486
A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
231.

See M. HALL & I. ELLMAN, supra note 219, at 282-83.
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document she executed states clearly that the patient wishes to refuse all "artificial means of treatment" in the event she has "an extreme physical or mental disability from which there is no
reasonable expectation of recovery." Her spouse and adult children, however, strenuously object to terminating artificial feeding.
Most physicians faced with this situation simply would not honor the
terms of the living will. 23 2 Moreover, physicians are not likely to
honor a living will unless they agree with it 2 3 3 or unless the patient
reaffirmed the living will during her hospitalization.2 3 4
The relevancy of these factors to treating physicians underscores the point that non-treatment decisions for incompetent patients are made by othersfor the patient. This is not to say that the
rhetoric of autonomy and self-determination, as well as the repeated
references in the cases to the patient's prior directives or statements
232. Based upon interviews with 57 physicians in California and Vermont in 1985,
Joel Zinberg concluded "that physicians will not terminate care if there is persistent
family disagreement, even if the physicians are persuaded that continued treatment accurately represents [the] patient's wishes." Zinberg, Decisionsfor the Dying: An Empirical
Study of Physicians' Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445, 479 (1989). Apparently physicians in California (where noncompliance may subject a physician to professional discipline if the physician fails to take steps to transfer the patient to another
physician, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1989)), and Vermont
(which requires physicians to comply with the directive or transfer the patient to a physician who will, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256 (1987), but does not provide for penalties against a noncomplying physician, see Zinberg, supra, at 463) are at least as likely to
ignore a living will when family members want treatment to continue as are their counterparts in New York, which has no living will statute at all. See N.Y. TASK FORCE, supra
note 198, at 76, 176 (table F-1) (reporting results of survey of New York hospitals; 57%
would not honor a living will without family members' acquiescence in non-treatment).
Over time, the living will in this situation may prove influential in producing a family
consensus in favor of termination, see Zinberg, supra, at 479, although the consensus may
result equally from the mere passage of time and the opportunity for family members to
adjust to the situation of their loved one.
233. See N.Y. TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 176 (table F-1) (64% of hospitals surveyed required the agreement of the attending physician before they would enforce a
living will). As stated supra note 232, New York does not have a living will statute.
Although that fact would suggest that living wills simply have not gained the same level
of acceptance in New York as elsewhere, a comparison between New York, on the one
hand, and California and Vermont, on the other, suggests that there is no major difference in professional attitudes in states with living will legislation and states without. See
supra note 232. These results contrast curiously with those of a recent survey of Arkansas physicians in which almost 80% of the physicians said they viewed advance directives
favorably. See Davidson, Hackler, Caradine & McCord, Physicians'Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262J. A.M.A. 2415, 2415 (1989).
234. N.Y. TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 176 (table F-I) (69% of hospitals surveyed
stated they would not honor a living will under these circumstances). The developing
tort of wrongful refusal to terminate life-sustaining treatment, see Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395-98, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-55 (1984), may influence a
change in physicians' attitudes.
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of preference, may not serve a valuable function.2 5 The knowledge
that non-treatment is what the patient would have wanted undoubtedly helps family members and other loved ones through the difficult experience of prolonged illness or disability with no hope of
recovery. The sense that directives and other statements made
before entering the hospital will control or influence decision-makers if the patient should become permanently incompetent certainly
enhances the sense of autonomy the rest of us enjoy as competent
persons. That sense may make it easier for many patients to enter a
hospital and undergo risky procedures, at least to the extent they
feel assured that their lives will not be maintained artifically after all
hope of a meaningful life has vanished. In addition, in our search
for a useful guide to medical decision-making for incompetent patients, the "substituted judgment" standard may seem more comforting and less threatening than the "best-interests-of-the-patient"
standard, which invites us to make a quality-of-life determination
about the patient's condition and which easily could evolve into a
more ominous best-interests-of-society standard.
None of these advantages contradicts the fact that we-the surrogate decision-maker and, in turn, the-physician, the hospital, the
judge, and society-are the ones who choose to let a particular PVS
patient die when we direct that nutrition and hydration be terminated. Non-treatment is not a decision that the incompetent patient
presently chooses,23 6 nor does she experience any sense of diminished self-determination if her advance directives or preferences are
not followed. In short, her autonomy interests are not necessarily
implicated in the decision whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment and, without an interest in autonomy, her right to privacy

235. Professor Rebecca Dresser has argued in a forceful essay that the supposed advantages of the theory of autonomy and the "substituted judgment" and "reasonable
patient" standards are illusory at best and, at worst, may lead to inappropriate treatment
decisions. See Dresser, supra note 230, at 404-05. Even if one disagrees with Professor.
Dresser's conclusions, however, her premises seem solid: We have chosen to adopt the
prevailing standards for medical decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients. Despite the references those standards make to the patient's own treatment preferences
(real or supposed), the surrogate decision-maker in fact decides, even to the point of
deciding to be bound by those prior statements. See also Rhoden, supra note 7, at 445-46
(disagreeing with Dresser's conclusions, but noting: "It is all-too-tempting to obscure
with euphemisms the fact that doctors, families, and courts are letting patients die").
236. The key word here is "presently." While it makes common sense to say a PVS
patient who has executed a living will has chosen a course of non-treatment, see, e.g.,
Rhoden, supra note 7, at 382, the patient obviously is not making the choice today. The
only decisions being made "today" are those made by proxy decision-makers who
choose to give effect to the advance directive.
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would seem to be equally irrelevant.2" 7
Even if the Supreme Court conceptualizes the issue of medical
decision-making for PVS patients in the currently prevailing terms
of privacy and autonomy, however, a number of concerns counsel
against extending the protection of the federal constitution that far.
If the Court concludes that the constitution recognizes an interest in
refusing life-sustaining medical care, it must then determine the
substantive and procedural implications of that constitutional right.
For example, in 1982 the Court in Mills v. Rogers,23 8 agreed to decide whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a consti23 9
tutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
Because both parties agreed that the constitution recognizes such a
liberty interest, 2 40 the Court was not required to decide the issue.
The Court went on:
This question has both substantive and procedural aspects ....

Assuming [the parties] are correct ....

the sub-

stantive issue involves a definition of that protected
constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum
procedures required by the Constitution for determining
that the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed
in a particular instance.2 4 '
The range of issues that will be presented to the Court is impressively (or depressingly) long and includes:
(1) Is the appropriate standard for decision-making on behalf
of an incompetent patient "substituted judgment," "patient's24 2best
interests," some combination of the two, or something else.?
(2) Are nutrition and hydration different enough from other
forms of medical treatment to permit many states to continue to
prohibit their termination (and would the presence or absence of a
living will in the case produce a different result)? In addition to the
237. This seems to be the crux of Professor Tribe's argument that "attributing 'rights'
to . . . patients [who are irreversibly comatose or in a chronic vegetative state] at all is
somewhat problematic." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-11, at 1368
n.25 (2d ed. 1988).
238. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
239. Id. at 294.
240. See id. at 299.
241. Id. at 299 (citations omitted).

242. The Court conceivably could finesse this issue by holding that none of the standards currently used by state courts impermissibly burdens the privacy rights of incompetent patients.
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debate over active and passive euthanasia,24 3 this issue implicates
the constitutionality of at least nineteen state living will statutes and
2 44
natural death acts.
(3) Must a hospital whose policies forbid the termination of
life-sustaining treatment acquiesce if the patient's representative requests termination?
(4) May the state balance against the patient's right such factors
as the patient's age and marital status and the presence of minor
children (and when, if ever, will those factors outweigh the interests
of the patient in terminating treatment)?
(5) Does a state's requirement that the incompetent patient's
preference for non-treatment be established by clear and convincing
evidence, or that the right to refuse treatment cannot be exercised
by a third party absent a formally executed living will, impermissibly
burden the patient's privacy right?
(6) Will a public hospital that wrongfully refuses to terminate
life-sustaining treatment be liable for damages under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code, for a constitutional tort, or
under some other theory of liability?
(7) May states create presumptions in favor (or against) the
continuation of certain forms of treatment if various circumstances
exist? Would an irrebuttable presumption against discontinuation
of, for example, artificial nutrition and hydration, be constitutional?
(8) What level of proof constitutionally could be required to
rebut a presumption concerning medical care? Is the "clear and
convincing" standard invoked by New York and Missouri too high
as a matter of law? Is it too high as applied by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Cruzan?
(9) In the case of incompetent patients, may a state constitutionally limit the right to terminate medical care to patients who are
terminally ill, or must states extend the right to patients who are in
an irreversible condition as well?
(10) May the state apply different rules to conscious incompetent patients than to incompetent patients who are unconscious?
One might well ask whether the Supreme Court is institutionally
competent to deal effectively with issues that touch, directly or indirectly, on such difficult and sensitive subjects as patient care and
standards of medical practice and medical ethics.
Apart from the Court's ability to make discerning judgments
243. See supra notes 195-217 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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about such interdependent, correlative matters on a case-by-case
basis, these issues illustrate the significant challenge to federalism
presented by cases such as Cruzan and those that will follow if the
Court holds that they implicated the federal right of privacy. Regulation of medical practice generally is left to the states. State regulation, in turn, has been heavily influenced (and augmented) by
accreditation and credentialing entities, medical societies, medical
schools, and the like, as well as the influence of tort law and the
presence of first-party malpractice insurers and third-party healthcare payors. My fear is that the Court cannot involve the federal
judiciary in all of these issues without short-circuiting the existing
mechanism that is our best bet for developing a workable professional and social consensus for dealing with incompetent patients.
Admittedly, the same argument might be made about abortion-that is, the Court should have let the political, professional,
and social processes develop a broad, workable consensus on the
subject, rather than impose a rule by judicial fiat. The result of the
Court's decisions, it could be argued, has been to extend and intensify the divisive debate over abortion. Even if the debate would have
been as long and as hot if the Court had never decided Roe v. Wade,
the political process, the argument goes, is the more traditional and
legitimate vehicle for harmonizing the conflicting demands of the
partisans. 245
Perhaps ironically, however, my suggestion that the Court not
federalize the "right to die" actually is consistent with the Court's
interventionism on the abortion front. In its abortion cases, the
Court has attempted to eliminate efforts by the states-efforts both
crude (criminalization) and subtle (regulation)-to override evolving standards of medical practice and medical ethics with respect to
abortion. The Court has done this by, among other things, protecting independent, professional judgment from excessive interference
by the states.24 6 In this regard, the Court can be seen as protecting
the primary right to choose an abortion by freeing the sphere of
medical judgment and medical practice from unduly restrictive governmental interference.
245. One does not have to agree with this line of argument to recognize that four
Justices currently believe something very much like it. The opinions in Webster by Chief
Justice Rehnquist (for himself and Justices White and Kennedy), Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3056-57, 3058 (1989), and Justice Scalia, id. at 306467, emphasize the advantages they see in committing the politically divisive issue of
abortion largely, and perhaps entirely, to the political process.
246. See supra notes 109-128 and accompanying text.
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With respect to an incompetent patient, however, the sphere of
medical judgment and medical practice is primary. Recognition of a
woman's right to choose an abortion does not give rise to an obligation on the part of any physician to perform it. On the other hand,
judicial recognition of a patient's right to choose to have a feeding
tube removed or a ventilator turned off does give rise to a physician's or hospital's obligation to comply.
If terminating treatment offends the ethical standards of the
hospital or the responsible physician, two options are available.
First, a court can order them to terminate treatment, effectively allowing the patient's right not to be treated to override their objections.2 4 7 Or, to ameliorate this conflict of values, a court can permit
the institution to transfer the patient (in George Annas' telling
phrase, "the ethical hot potato") 24 to a facility that is willing to terminate the life-sustaining procedures.2 4 9 In either event, however, a
medical treatment decision will have been made and imposed by order of a court. This is a level of interference with the medical profession that the Court has worked hard in its abortion cases to
prevent the states from imposing. It would be ironic if the Court fell
into the same role by recognizing an incompetent patient's federal
constitutional right to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or
withdrawn.
In response, it might be argued that the Missouri court in
247. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988); In reJobes, 108 NJ.
394, 424-26, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (1987); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d
886, 890 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986). See generally Miles, Singer & Siegler, Conflicts Between Patients' Wishes to Forego Treatment and the
Policies of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEw ENG.J. MED. 48 (1989) (review of cases addressing institutions' right to refuse to cooperate with patients who want to refuse further
treatment).
248. See Annas, Transferringthe Ethical Hot Potato, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at
20.
249. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d
626 (1986). The case involved a firefighter in a persistent vegetative state who was receiving his nutrition through a gastrostomy tube. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled that the patient had a right under the common law and the state constitution
to have treatment terminated. Id. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at 633. The court, however,
agreed with the hospital's position that "[neither ... the Massachusetts patients' rights
statute, the doctrine of informed consent, nor any other provision of law requires the
hospital to cease hydration and nutrition upon request of the guardian." Id. at 440-41,
497 N.E.2d at 639. The court ruled that Massachusetts law did not "justify compelling
medical professionals, in a case such as this, to take measures which are contrary to their
view of their ethical duty toward their patients." Id. at 441, 497 N.E.2d at 639. Thus,
the court directed that "[a] new judgment is to be entered ordering the hospital to assist
the guardian in transferring the ward to a suitable facility, or to his home, where his
wishes may be effectuated .... " Id., 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
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Cruzan has overridden the judgment and practice of the physicians
and the hospitals in its state, and that the Supreme Court's response
should be to recognize the incompetent patient's right and free
medical professionals and institutions from the dictates of the Missouri Supreme Court. The argument, though, overlooks the fact
that the only way the Supreme Court can eliminate the Missouricourt-as-medical-board is to interpose itself-as-medical-board.
If a supreme court is going to be actively involved in the regulation of medical practice in Missouri, my preference is for that court
to be a state court, not federal. The reason is the essentially pragmatic one discussed earlier: the states are the social laboratories in
which sometimes disparate answers to these kinds of problems can
be developed and compared to the answers produced in other
states. The evolution of living will statutes in thirty-eight states, all
different and many of them changing over time, is an illustration of
the responsiveness of the social and political processes to changing
professional norms and personal preferences. 2 50 People-patients,
physicians, hospital administrators, legislators-have the motive and
the means to change the rules they do not like. In the meantime,
caution rather than haste, particularly as we traverse the frontiers of
bioethics, and a spirit that seeks to do the greatest good by doing
the least harm, should guide the Court.2 5 '
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is confronted with two questions in Cruzan.
The ultimate question is whether the Missouri S'upreme Court correctly determined the rights of Nancy Beth Cruzan, a young woman
250. See supra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
251. In an apparent shift in perspective from the first volume of his treatise to the
second, Professor Tribe recently has come out on the side of caution. Compare L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-11, at 937 (1st ed. 1978) (noting that New Jersey

Supreme Court's "premature if reasonably thoughtful constitutionalization of a difficult
and still fluid area ... may have needlessly foreclosed more intelligent legislative solutions in that state") with L. TRIBE, supra note 237, § 15-11, at 1370-71:
[T]he judiciary's silence regarding such constitutional principles probably reflects a concern that, once recognized, rights to die might be uncontainable and
might prove susceptible to grave abuse, more than it suggests that courts cannot be persuaded that self-determination and personhood may include a right
to dictate the circumstances under which life is to be ended. In any event,
whatever the reason for the absence in the courts of expansive notions about
self-determination, the resulting deference to legislatures may prove wise in
light of the complex character of the rights at stake and the significant potential
that, without careful statutory guidelines and gradually evolved procedural
controls, legalizing euthanasia, rather than respecting people, may endanger
personhood.
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in a persistent vegetative state, and her parent-guardians. There is
no doubt the court has left the parents in agony. There also is little
doubt that some state courts would have reached a different result
on this ultimate question,2 52 while other courts likely would have
ruled the same way. 2 53 Moreover, medical ethicists, legal scholars,

physicians, and the lay public disagree over the correct way to deal
with patients in Nancy Beth Cruzan's condition.
The penultimate question before the Supreme Court, though,
is whether the state courts should remain free to disagree, or
whether the Supreme Court should begin to mark certain positions
out-of-bounds under the fourteenth amendment. This article has
attempted to demonstrate that it is not yet time for the Court to fix
the terms of the debate over non-treatment decisions for PVS
patients.
In his remarkable little book, Western Attitudes Toward Death:
From the Middle Ages to the Present,2 5 4 published a year before Karen
Ann Quinlan entered the hospital, Phillipe Aribs described death in
the modern hospital:
Death in the hospital is no longer the occasion of a
ritual ceremony, over which the dying person presides
amidst his assembled relatives and friends. Death is a technical phenomenon obtained by a cessation of care, a cessation determined in a more or less avowed way by a decision
of the doctor and the hospital team. Indeed, in the majority of cases the dying person has already lost consciousness. Death has been dissected, cut to bits by a series of
little steps, which finally makes it impossible to know which
step was the real death, the one in which consciousness was
lost, or the one in which breathing stopped. All these little
silent deaths have replaced and erased the great dramatic
act of death, and no one any longer has the strength or
patience to wait over a period of weeks for a moment which
25 5
has lost a part of its meaning.
Technology has changed not only the individual experience of
death, but its social meaning as well. We continue to struggle with
that new meaning, looking for new ways to deal with our new ways
of dying, ways that we can live with.
252. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 381-88, 486 A.2d 1209, 1240-44 (1985).
253. See In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534, 531 N.E.2d
607, 615-16, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 894-95 (1988).
254. P. ARI9S, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE
PRESENT (1974).

255. Id. at 88-89.
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My criticism of a new "right to die" is neither the usual
"charge[] from the right that 'new rights' lack objective foundations
[nor] the charge[] from the left that rights are indeterminate
...
256 Rather, it is that "rights" language misrepresents and distorts this new experience of dying. We do not solve the problem of
PVS patients, or even move closer to a solution of that problem, by
"empowering" them or by recognizing their right of autonomy.
Recognizing a federal right of privacy in this context moves along
the debates over euthanasia and the standards for decision-making
for PVS patients only by judicial fiat, rather than by discovering the
bases for a shared response. 5 7

256. Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1862
(1987).
257. Cf. Schneider, supra note 221, at 174-76 (rights language impedes resolution of
moral disagreements by making more difficult the accomodation of interests and workable compromise).

